



Programme Recovery

**PROGRAMME FALLING BEHIND – NEED
RECOVERY?**

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Context

Major transformation programmes can begin to lose focus and delivery confidence when progress slows, milestones move repeatedly, costs increase, governance becomes unclear, suppliers underperform or executive stakeholders no longer have confidence in the delivery position.

These situations are rarely caused by a single issue. Programme slippage often reflects a combination of delivery, governance, commercial, supplier, resourcing, dependency, planning and stakeholder-control problems, with scope creep and delivery drift further weakening programme direction.

Bentley Moore Executive supports organisations where programme delivery has moved beyond routine management and requires independent assessment, recovery planning, delivery control and senior-level intervention.

Issues and Symptoms

Organisations typically require programme recovery support when one or more of the following issues are present:

- major programme milestones are slipping;
- the programme is drifting from its original direction;
- scope creep is weakening delivery focus;
- programme status has moved to amber-red or red;
- delivery confidence is deteriorating;
- expected benefits are unclear, delayed, weakened or no longer being realised;
- multiple issues are creating a negative cascading effect;
- costs are increasing without clear delivery progress;
- governance is not providing sufficient control;
- reporting does not give executives a reliable view of risk, progress or delivery confidence;
- risks, issues, assumptions and dependencies are not being controlled effectively;
- suppliers or delivery partners are not performing as expected;
- delivery capability, capacity or resourcing is insufficient to meet programme demands;
- dependencies are emerging, unresolved or poorly managed;
- workstreams are misaligned;
- accountability for decisions, delivery ownership or issue resolution is unclear;
- decisions are delayed or repeatedly revisited;
- programme boards are receiving unclear or inconsistent information;
- stakeholders no longer agree on the true delivery position;
- business or operational readiness is not keeping pace with programme delivery;
- recovery activity is being discussed but is not yet controlled through a clear plan.

Why Programme Slippage Matters and the Risks

Programme slippage matters because it creates a complex, interconnected and cascading set of delivery, governance, dependency, cost and organisational issues that affect both the programme and the wider organisation.

When a major programme starts falling behind to the point that recovery support is required, it usually indicates that delivery control, governance, planning, supplier performance, dependency management or stakeholder alignment are no longer operating effectively enough to sustain the original delivery path.

Programme slippage reveals important information about the programme's underlying health, including whether the current plan remains realistic, whether leadership has a reliable view of delivery confidence, whether dependencies are being controlled, whether expected benefits remain achievable and what downstream impacts the delay is creating.

When a major programme starts falling behind, the underlying issues are rarely one-dimensional in nature. Significant programme slippage creates delivery risk, corporate risk, interdependency risk and cost-overrun risk. Milestones move, the critical path becomes unstable, workstreams fall out of sequence and delivery plans become increasingly difficult to rely on.

The programme's risk profile increases as delay in one workstream affects dependent activities, places further pressure on suppliers and delivery teams, increases unresolved dependencies and produces cumulative risk across other workstreams, the wider programme environment and the organisation.

Governance and executive-control risk increases as programme boards receive unclear or inconsistent reporting, escalation routes become harder to operate effectively and senior stakeholders lose confidence in the reliability of programme forecasts, delivery reporting and recovery assumptions.

Commercial and financial exposure increases as costs rise without equivalent delivery progress, budget-overrun risk increases, supplier costs or change requests grow and expected benefits become delayed, weakened or no longer credible.

In public sector, financial services, defence, regulated and multi-supplier environments, programme slippage has multi-dimensional effects. Organisational exposure increases across risk, cost, issue management, reputation and stakeholder confidence, while delay creates knock-on effects for other transformation activity, dependent initiatives and wider delivery commitments. Strategic objectives become harder to achieve, expected benefits, cost savings and efficiencies are delayed or weakened, and delivery failure affects service continuity, the ability to meet statutory obligations, effective policy delivery, operational resilience, supplier accountability and wider organisational credibility.

Without timely and effective intervention, delayed recovery causes organisations to continue funding activity without sufficient assurance that the programme can still be delivered as originally planned and expected. Consequently, unplanned cost exposure increases, confidence in intended benefits weakens, and executive decision-making shifts from delivery progression to issue resolution, escalation and containment.

Further time, money and leadership attention are consumed before the organisation has established whether the programme remains deliverable, what needs to change, what the implications of those required changes are and whether the current delivery model remains viable.

Relevant Experience and Evidence

Bentley Moore Executive's programme recovery capability is based on the Principal Consultant's direct experience across financial services, UK central government, regulated delivery environments, systems integrators, service integrators, multi-supplier operating models and major transformation settings where delivery confidence, governance control, supplier accountability, cost control or executive visibility required strengthening.

The examples below demonstrate recovery, stabilisation, governance repair, delivery assurance, supplier control and executive decision-support experience across mixed-sector environments.

They include direct programme recovery environments and delivery situations directly relevant to recovery, where inherited complexity, previous failure, weak governance, supplier dependency, cost exposure or fragmented control required structured intervention and practical delivery leadership.

Relevant examples include: failed enterprise architecture programme affecting 10,000 users; Transformation Programmes in Animal Information at Defra; EDRM-related delivery environments at Defra and the Home Office; service transition at HM Treasury; service transition at DVSA; CGI service transition for DECC; and Deutsche Bank global governance service delivery framework implementation.

Experience and Evidence at a Glance

Across these examples, the relevant experience includes leading and supporting recovery, stabilisation, governance repair and delivery-assurance activity across major delivery environments where programmes, service transitions, governance arrangements or complex delivery models were failing, falling significantly behind, losing delivery confidence or requiring structured intervention.

This experience spans financial services, defence, regulated delivery environments, UK central government, systems integrators, service integrators, multi-supplier service models, national emergency delivery contexts and major transformation programmes requiring strengthened governance, planning, assurance, cost containment, supplier control and recovery management.

The evidence includes programme recovery, failed enterprise architecture delivery, SIAM and service transition recovery, transformation programme assurance, EDRM-related delivery environments, organisational accountability redesign, supplier-control improvement and global governance framework implementation for centralised third-party vendor management.

- recovery, troubled delivery and high-risk delivery environments involving total contract values up to approximately £150m;
- programme and delivery environments ranging from approximately £500k to £22m;
- portfolio and wider transformation environments up to approximately £30m;
- service transition and SIAM-related activity within a wider transformation programme valued at approximately £70m+;
- transformation environments involving multiple strategic suppliers, service towers, incumbent suppliers, incoming suppliers and operational delivery teams;
- governance, delivery-assurance and operating-model activity across a UK central government departmental HQ and more than 19 arms-length bodies, strengthening cross-organisational visibility, assurance and delivery control;
- compilation, management and governance of approximately 750,000 architecture artefacts;
- global financial-services supplier governance involving approximately 7,000 suppliers across 35+ locations;
- senior stakeholder engagement across CIO, Deputy CIO, Directors, Programme Board, Executive Committee, SRO, supplier, commercial, operational and technology leadership environments.

Evidence of Scale

Relevant scale indicators include:

- recovery, troubled delivery and high-risk delivery environments involving total contract values up to approximately **£150m**;
- programme and delivery environments ranging from approximately **£500k to £22m**;
- portfolio and wider transformation environments up to approximately **£30m**;
- service transition and SIAM-related activity within a wider transformation programme valued at approximately **£70m+**;
- transformation environments involving multiple strategic suppliers, service towers, incumbent suppliers, incoming suppliers and operational delivery teams;
- governance, delivery-assurance and operating-model activity across a UK central government departmental HQ and more than **19 arms-length bodies**, strengthening cross-organisational visibility, assurance and delivery control;
- compilation, management and governance of approximately **750,000 architecture artefacts**;
- global financial-services supplier governance involving approximately **7,000 suppliers** across **35+ locations**;

- senior stakeholder engagement across CIO, Deputy CIO, Directors, Programme Board, Executive Committee, SRO, supplier, commercial, operational and technology leadership environments.

Evidence of Relevance

Recovery, Delivery Control and Executive Decision-Making

- recovery paths defined for distressed, troubled or high-risk delivery environments, supporting controlled intervention, delivery stabilisation and executive decision-making;
- delivery control strengthened where governance, planning, supplier coordination, accountability or delivery confidence had weakened;
- executive control restored through clearer governance, escalation routes, delivery reporting, delivery assurance and decision-making structures;
- delivery confidence improved by clarifying programme status, recovery options, implementation priorities, delivery feasibility and the actions required to regain control;
- programme deliverability and recovery feasibility assessed, enabling senior stakeholders to understand whether the current delivery path remained viable or required correction;
- programme direction assessed and strengthened under executive scrutiny, giving senior stakeholders clearer visibility of delivery risk, recovery options and implementation priorities;
- executive decision-making supported on whether to continue, reset, re-plan, recover or close activity where the original delivery model was no longer viable.

Governance, Accountability and Supplier Control

- governance and assurance structures implemented to improve executive visibility, escalation control, delivery reporting and decision-making confidence;
- governance frameworks operationalised as practical assurance, escalation, funding-control or delivery-control mechanisms rather than remaining advisory models;
- organisational accountability clarified or redesigned where fragmented ownership, unclear decision rights or dispersed delivery control were weakening performance;
- supplier accountability clarified within complex delivery, transition, multi-supplier and supplier-exit environments;
- supplier exit, onboarding, service-transition and multi-supplier dependencies brought under clearer governance and delivery control;
- senior stakeholder alignment improved where leadership disagreement, supplier tension, unclear accountability or conflicting delivery assumptions were obstructing recovery.

Operational, Commercial and Service Outcomes

- operational readiness, service transition control and BAU transition planning improved across complex service-transition and SIAM-related environments;
- operational continuity protected or strengthened in high-risk service transition, national emergency, regulated and multi-supplier delivery environments;
- supplier-governance and commercial-control frameworks implemented to improve visibility, accountability, risk control and financial oversight;
- cost reduction, cost avoidance and savings outcomes identified, enabled or realised through governance repair, supplier control, licence optimisation, delivery review and commercial intervention;
- executive stakeholders provided with clearer options, delivery-risk insight, recovery recommendations and practical decision-support in complex delivery environments.

Evidence Example 1 — CGI Service Transition and SIAM Programme for HM Treasury — Multi-Workstream Delivery Advisory Environment**Situation**

HM Treasury was operating within a complex service and transformation environment involving multiple workstreams, supplier dependencies, service-transition considerations and senior programme governance.

The delivery environment required clear assessment of programme direction, service-transition implications, supplier coordination, delivery feasibility and risk. The programme required advisory input capable of helping senior leadership understand whether the delivery approach remained coherent, controlled and capable of supporting the intended transition outcomes.

Intervention

Programme advisory support was provided to senior programme leadership, including review of delivery direction, workstream alignment, supplier and transition dependencies, governance considerations, service-transition implications and practical delivery feasibility.

The role required translating complex programme, supplier, transition and delivery-risk issues into clear leadership advice, enabling senior decision-makers to better understand the programme position, the implications of delivery choices and the areas requiring further control or intervention.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

- Service transition and SIAM environment valued at approximately £53m;
- multiple programme workstreams;
- service-transition and SIAM-related considerations;
- senior programme leadership advisory context;

- supplier-led delivery complexity;
- delivery-risk assessment across programme direction, transition readiness, supplier dependencies and governance control.
- Outcome
- The work supported clearer programme understanding, strengthened senior-level delivery advisory input and contributed to leadership's ability to assess programme direction, delivery risk, supplier dependency and service-transition implications.
- It helped provide a clearer view of the programme's delivery position, the areas requiring closer control and the practical considerations affecting transition feasibility.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This example is relevant because programme recovery often requires senior-level assessment before corrective action can be defined and implemented.

The HM Treasury example demonstrates experience assessing complex programme environments where service-transition risk, supplier dependencies, multi-workstream alignment and delivery feasibility needed to be understood clearly by senior leadership. It evidences the ability to provide practical delivery advice in a high-value public-sector transformation environment where programme direction, risk and transition implications required careful assessment.

Evidence Example 2 — DVSA: Service Transition, SIAM and Programme Recovery Environment

Situation

DVSA was undertaking major transformation activity involving SIAM implementation, service transition and multi-supplier operating model change.

The organisation had not previously operated a SIAM model and lacked the service transition maturity, transition governance structure, operational readiness and Service Transition Strategy required to move confidently from transformation into BAU.

The wider transformation environment involved multiple suppliers, service towers, incumbent supplier exit considerations, incoming supplier dependencies and organisational delivery dependencies, with transition delivery operating inside a programme environment valued in excess of £70m.

Intervention

A structured due diligence and recovery-oriented assessment was undertaken across service transition, SIAM governance, operational readiness, supplier dependencies, workstream maturity, delivery feasibility, contract and commercial dependencies, incumbent supplier exit readiness and programme direction.

This included engagement with programme leadership, supplier representatives, operational stakeholders, Programme Board, Senior Leadership Team and Executive Committee-level governance.

The work moved beyond advisory commentary. It identified practical weaknesses in transition governance, supplier exit readiness, operational design, BAU service readiness and SIAM operating-model maturity, then shaped the governance and delivery approach required to stabilise transition activity, strengthen transition control and improve delivery confidence.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

- wider transformation programme valued in excess of £70m;
- service transition budget control of approximately £2.7m;
- SIAM and service transition activity across multiple suppliers and service towers;
- transition planning affecting approximately 2,300 users;
- supplier dependencies involving Atos and Capita;
- incumbent supplier exit, incoming supplier transition and multi-supplier operating-model considerations;
- governance engagement across Programme Board, Senior Leadership Team and Executive Committee environments.

Outcome

The assessment and intervention helped define the service transition strategy, strengthen SIAM governance, clarify operational readiness requirements and establish a more controlled route from transformation, through service transition and into BAU.

It provided executive leadership and senior stakeholders with a clearer view of delivery risk, service transition feasibility, governance gaps, supplier dependencies, additional cost exposure and commitments, operational readiness and the practical actions required to improve delivery confidence.

The work strengthened service transition control and transformation assurance by clarifying what was required to move from transformation activity into an operational SIAM and service management environment with greater confidence, control, organisational readiness and operational readiness.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This is directly relevant to programme recovery because the work involved diagnosis of a complex delivery environment, assessment of governance weakness, supplier dependency control, executive advisory and assurance, service transition feasibility and practical recovery planning within a major transformation setting.

It demonstrates the ability to strengthen control in a high-risk service transition environment where service transition and SIAM maturity, supplier exit, service-tower transition, operational readiness and BAU transition planning needed to be brought under clearer governance, assurance, delivery control and transparency.

Evidence Example 3 — Defra: Enterprise Architecture Governance and Delivery Assurance Framework

Situation

Across the Defra family, enterprise architecture and technology governance was fragmented across a central government department and more than 19 arm's-length bodies, with inconsistent local approaches, limited cross-organisational alignment and insufficient central visibility over technology planning, assurance and delivery control.

The enterprise architecture environment had previously failed to provide the level of governance, delivery assurance, cross-organisational control and strategic technology direction required across the wider Defra family. This affected technology planning, duplication control, investment alignment and the ability to support long-term convergence across a complex organisational estate.

The absence of a consistent governance framework made it harder to control duplication, align investment decisions, manage delivery assurance and support long-term strategic technology convergence.

Intervention

A new enterprise architecture governance and operating model was designed and implemented across the Defra family.

This included establishing the Network Architecture Design Board, defining governance processes, creating assurance controls, engaging Chief Executives, CTOs, Managing Directors, Vice Presidents and operational leads, and aligning strategic supplier activity with the new governance model.

The governance framework was implemented as a practical operating control mechanism. It provided a structured route for assurance, escalation, approval and funding-control decisions, strengthening visibility, governance control and decision-making across participating organisations.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

- governance implementation across a central government department and more than **19 arm's-length bodies**;
- enterprise architecture and governance activity affecting approximately **10,000 users**;

- operational compilation, management and governance of approximately **750,000 architecture artefacts**;
- strategic roadmapping covering a **5–7 year convergence horizon**;
- engagement with **IBM** as strategic supplier;
- engagement across Chief Executive, CTO, Managing Director, Vice President and operational leadership communities;
- estimated cost avoidance / savings of approximately **£2m in year one** and **£4m in year two**.

Outcome

The governance framework improved cross-organisational visibility, strengthened delivery assurance, reduced duplication, created clearer technology-governance controls and supported a longer-term convergence roadmap.

It provided a repeatable governance structure for assessing, approving and controlling technology-related delivery activity across a complex organisational landscape.

The framework also strengthened executive visibility and decision-making by turning enterprise architecture governance into a practical assurance, approval and funding-control mechanism rather than a disconnected advisory activity.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This is relevant to programme recovery because falling programmes frequently deteriorate when governance is fragmented, decision rights are unclear, assurance is weak, controls are inconsistent and executive visibility is limited.

The Defra example demonstrates practical experience restoring governance control, strengthening delivery assurance, improving executive visibility and implementing a repeatable control framework across a complex multi-organisation environment.

It is particularly relevant where programme recovery requires governance repair, assurance controls, supplier alignment, investment discipline, roadmap correction and stronger executive decision-making.

Evidence Example 4 — Defra: National Disease Response Governance and Organisational Accountability Redesign

Situation

Following national disease-response activity, systemic governance, accountability and operational coordination weaknesses were identified across Defra HQ, operational agencies, arms-length bodies and strategic suppliers.

The delivery environment involved high operational pressure, public-sector complexity, cross-agency coordination and senior leadership visibility.

The existing model had fragmented coordination and reporting arrangements, with operational accountability spread across different parts of the Defra family.

Intervention

A strategic organisational analysis was undertaken across the end-to-end operational, governance and delivery chain supporting national disease response capability.

The analysis identified weaknesses in accountability, reporting lines, operational coordination, data ownership, funding alignment and cross-agency governance.

A revised operating and governance model was proposed, centralising control and coordination of national disease outbreak response activity within the primary disease control agency, including cross-Defra family operational coordination, data ownership, reporting accountability and operational management responsibility.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

- national emergency and disease-response environment;
- cross-Defra family coordination involving HQ, operational agencies, arms-length bodies and strategic suppliers;
- CIO, Deputy CIO, Director General and Chief Executive-level visibility;
- organisational accountability redesign affecting operational coordination, reporting structures, funding alignment and ministerial-level reporting.

Outcome

The recommendations were escalated through senior leadership and adopted within the wider national disease-response operating and governance approach.

The revised model introduced clearer accountability, stronger operational coordination, improved executive visibility and more direct ministerial reporting structures.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This is relevant to programme recovery because distressed programmes often require organisational accountability repair, decision-right clarification, reporting redesign, governance escalation and executive-level intervention.

This example demonstrates the ability to diagnose structural delivery problems and propose practical governance and accountability changes at organisational scale.

Evidence Example 4 — Defra: National Animal Disease Response Governance, Control and Organisational Accountability Redesign

Situation

Following national disease-response activity, systemic governance, accountability and operational coordination weaknesses were identified across Defra HQ, operational agencies, arms-length bodies and strategic suppliers.

The delivery environment involved high operational pressure, public-sector multi-agency complexity, cross-agency coordination, cross-organisational reporting, ministerial visibility, senior-leadership scrutiny and nationally significant operational consequences.

The existing model had fragmented coordination and reporting arrangements, with operational accountability spread across different parts of the Defra family.

During national disease outbreak response activity, different parts of Defra, operational agencies and arms-length bodies could activate overlapping processes, undertake similar information-gathering activity and collect duplicate or partially overlapping data relating to the same outbreak, location, premises, disease characteristics, transmission risk and environmental context.

This created duplication and overlap across activities, weakened clarity over control, reporting ownership and operational coordination, and made national aggregation of outbreak data more difficult where multiple bodies were collecting or reporting related information through different regional, operational or departmental routes.

Intervention

A strategic organisational analysis was undertaken across the end-to-end national disease-response delivery chain, including the operational triggers, governance arrangements, control points, reporting flows, data ownership and cross-agency activities activated by different parts of Defra, operational agencies and arms-length bodies during a national disease outbreak response.

The analysis identified weaknesses in accountability, reporting lines, operational coordination, data ownership, funding alignment, cross-agency governance and the aggregation of outbreak-related information where different organisations were collecting overlapping data against the same national disease-response event.

A revised operating and governance model was proposed, introducing clearer lines of accountability, responsibility, coordination and reporting across the national disease-response environment.

The proposed model centralised operational coordination of national disease outbreak response activity within the primary disease control agency, including

cross-Defra family operational coordination, data collation, data aggregation and ownership of the consolidated operational reporting position.

It also introduced revised ministerial-level reporting lines and created a parallel reporting alignment with Defra Policy, which had managed the existing fragmented model.

This allowed operational disease-response information to be consolidated through the primary disease control agency while maintaining policy-level visibility, ministerial reporting alignment and a clearer route for executive and departmental oversight.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

- national emergency and disease-response environment involving operational, governance, reporting and coordination activity across the wider Defra family;
- cross-Defra family coordination involving Defra HQ, operational agencies, arms-length bodies and strategic suppliers;
- multi-agency disease-response activity involving different Defra business functions, operational agencies and arms-length bodies activating overlapping response processes, undertaking parallel or staggered parallel information-gathering activity and collecting duplicate or partially overlapping data relating to the same outbreak, premises, disease characteristics, transmission risk and environmental context;
- outbreak-related information drawn from multiple regional, operational, agency and departmental reporting routes, where different bodies were collecting overlapping data about the same disease event, premises, location, transmission characteristics and environmental context, creating the need for clearer ownership of data collation, reconciliation, aggregation and the authoritative national operational position;
- CIO, Deputy CIO, Director General, Chief Executive and ministerial-level visibility;
- organisational accountability redesign covering revised responsibility for operational coordination, outbreak-data ownership, reporting accountability, funding alignment, executive oversight and ministerial-level reporting, including clearer separation and alignment between Defra Policy, the primary disease control agency, operational agencies and arms-length bodies in relation to policy oversight, operational coordination, data aggregation and consolidated national reporting;
- proposed centralisation of national disease-response operational coordination within the primary disease control agency, including responsibility for coordinating cross-Defra family operational activity, collating outbreak-related data, aggregating information from overlapping agency and departmental reporting routes, owning the consolidated operational reporting position and maintaining aligned reporting visibility with Defra Policy;

- revised reporting alignment between the primary disease control agency and Defra Policy, enabling the primary disease control agency to provide a clearer consolidated national operational position while maintaining policy visibility, departmental oversight and ministerial reporting alignment.

Outcome

The recommendations were escalated through senior leadership and adopted within the wider national disease-response operating and governance approach.

The revised model supported better delivery of departmental strategic objectives by creating a more effective and efficient disease-control model and associated operational processes. It centralised control for national disease-response coordination, outbreak-data collation, data aggregation and consolidated reporting within the primary disease control agency.

The model improved accountability and responsibility clarity across Defra and the wider family by redefining ownership for operational coordination, reporting accountability, data aggregation and national operational visibility during an animal disease outbreak.

The revised ministerial-level reporting arrangements also enabled significantly greater ministerial visibility, supporting better, faster and more time-critical ministerial decision-making during animal disease outbreaks, where timely operational information, clear escalation routes, authoritative national reporting and rapid decision-making were operationally critical.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This is relevant to programme recovery because distressed or failing programmes often require more than revised planning activity. They may require organisational accountability repair, decision-right clarification, reporting redesign, governance escalation, data ownership clarification and executive-level intervention before delivery control can be restored.

The Defra example demonstrates the ability to diagnose structural delivery problems where fragmented accountability, overlapping activity, unclear reporting ownership and dispersed operational control were weakening the organisation's ability to coordinate delivery and maintain a reliable view of the national operational position.

It also demonstrates experience designing practical governance and accountability changes at organisational scale, including clearer ownership of coordination, reporting, data aggregation, executive visibility and ministerial-level decision support.

This is particularly relevant to programme recovery where restoring delivery confidence depends on clarifying who owns delivery control, who owns reporting, who aggregates the delivery position, how overlapping or duplicated activity is removed, how operational efficiency is improved, how escalation routes are

strengthened and how senior leaders and ministers receive clear, reliable and timely information to support decision-making.

Evidence Example 5 — Deutsche Bank: Global Supplier Governance, Licence Control and Recovery-Relevant Transformation Delivery

Situation

Deutsche Bank had undertaken a major outsource with HP valued at approximately £750m, covering service provision, application development, the TUPE transfer of staff and the novation of several thousand third-party contract service-provider arrangements.

The outsource materially affected multiple service towers, including data centre facilities, Unix, Wintel, provisioning and other service areas. The outsource was not a clean organisational split. Across the Deutsche Bank estate, different service elements were outsourced at different levels, with partial outsourcing arrangements operating across different parts of the retained and outsourced environment.

This created significant retained-organisation complexity and urgency to establish new retained-organisation capability. The new owners inherited contractual responsibilities, governance expectations and retained-organisation obligations contained within the HP outsource contract, while the organisational-design, governance, accountability and control arrangements required to discharge those obligations were not yet fully in place.

Prior to the outsource, Deutsche Bank had unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the issue of uncoordinated and siloed global software-licence management.

That earlier attempt had failed because of unresolved jurisdictional issues across the US, UK, Germany, Singapore and other global regions; the absence of an agreed central governance board; inability to define the operating model and processes; difficulty accessing and collating retained third-party contracts; language complexity across jurisdictions; regional budgetary control without central override; lack of a comprehensive RACI; absence of a single accountable director; and conflict between senior directors in different global regions.

The inherited situation therefore combined two problems: the unresolved legacy of a previous failed attempt to establish global supplier and licence-control governance, and new contractual obligations created by the HP outsource that required Deutsche Bank to operate retained-organisation governance, responsibility and control arrangements that did not yet exist in practice.

This was not a stalled programme recovery in the narrow sense. Its relevance to programme recovery lies in the inherited failure, troubleshooting requirement, transformation delivery challenge, governance repair, retained-organisation design, supplier-control complexity, stakeholder alignment requirement and regulated global financial-services environment.

Intervention

A recovery-relevant transformation and governance approach was designed to make the retained-organisation supplier, contract and licence-control model workable in practice.

The intervention began with diagnosis of the previous failed attempt, the newly inherited outsource obligations, the retained third-party contract environment, the new director-level accountabilities, regional budget-control issues, supplier-management responsibilities, governance gaps, process gaps and conflicting stakeholder positions across the global organisation.

The intervention defined how the retained organisation would operate in practice, including governance responsibilities, decision rights, supplier-control processes, contract visibility, financial accountability and escalation routes required to discharge the obligations created by the HP outsource.

The approach defined the transformation programme, rationale, governance framework, operating model, processes, risk controls, financial controls, RACI, escalation paths, decision rights and roadmap required to bring the retained supplier, contract and licence environment under clearer global control.

A single accountable owner in the US was identified as having ultimate decision authority, including the ability to veto or make binding decisions where regional or director-level conflict prevented progress. The global governance model operated from the US for coordination and policy setting, while allowing practical accommodation for countries operating on materially different timelines or under different jurisdictional constraints.

The proposed model included a governance board, defined stakeholder roles, formal decision-making arrangements, financial reporting, supplier and licence-control processes, a roadmap for collating existing contracts, minimum criteria for obtaining new service providers, language requirements across more than 39 countries and tooling requirements to store supplier, service, contract and decision information.

The approach also defined how board activity would operate in practice, including governance papers, decision records, reporting responsibilities, financial-accountability information and the administrative support required to sustain the model.

HP was also to be given a seat on the governance board to provide reporting, support compliance with the agreed standards and approach, and align with key senior stakeholders. Licence control was initially to be managed through a consolidated spreadsheet model, with the intention of reproducing the information into a relational database.

The approach was designed as an implementable delivery roadmap rather than a policy document, enabling subsequent adoption and delivery by the accountable Vice President and implementation team.

Scale

- regulated global financial-services and investment-banking environment;
- approximately **£750m** outsource with HP covering service provision, application development, TUPE transfer of staff and novation of several thousand third-party contract service-provider arrangements;

- multiple affected service towers, including data centre facilities, Unix, Wintel, and provisioning;
- retained-organisation complexity following substantial workforce redundancy, transfer of staff to HP under TUPE, transfer of day-to-day operational ownership and management of third-party suppliers and independent contractors, and promotion of new service-tower and business-area owners into newly accountable roles;
- retained-organisation obligations arising from the HP outsource contract, requiring new governance, accountability, supplier-control, reporting and operating-model arrangements to be defined and made operational;
- approximately **7,000 retained third-party contracts** requiring improved visibility, control, collation and governance;
- global supplier, contract and licence-management complexity across the US, UK, Germany, Singapore and other jurisdictions;
- language and contract-collation requirements across more than **39 countries**;
- regional and jurisdictional budgetary control issues, with no previous central veto or binding decision authority;
- governance design involving Directors, Vice Presidents, operational leads, procurement, supplier management, finance, contract management, commercial management and technology stakeholders;
- creation of a global governance model with a single accountable US owner, defined escalation routes, decision rights, RACI and board-level operating arrangements;
- global governance-board operating model covering board participation, reporting, governance papers, decision records, financial-accountability information, escalation routes and compliance with agreed standards;
- strategic supplier governance integration through proposed HP participation on the global governance board to support reporting, standards compliance and senior stakeholder alignment;
- licence-control information initially consolidated through a large spreadsheet model, with requirements defined for migration into a relational database to support supplier, service, contract, licence and decision information;
- enterprise-level licence agreement opportunities across jurisdictions with similar service requirements but different pricing arrangements;
- savings and cost-avoidance opportunities identified across immediate licence renewals within **1–3 months** and a longer period of **12–18 month renewal roadmap**;
- longer term projected savings and cost-avoidance opportunities of approximately **£16.5m in year one, £20m in year two and £12m in year three**.

Outcome

The proposed model was presented to the accountable US director, who approved the approach in its entirety without challenge.

The outcome converted a previously unresolved global supplier and licence-control problem into an approved delivery model with defined ownership, governance, decision rights and implementation responsibility.

The model created a coherent global governance framework for retained supplier, contract and licence-control activity, including defined accountability, decision rights, escalation routes, risk controls, financial controls, RACI, reporting arrangements, governance papers, decision records and board-level operating arrangements.

It established a clearer basis for centralising supplier, licence, contract, service, decision and financial-accountability information in the US, while allowing regional and jurisdictional differences to be accommodated within a single global governance approach.

The framework also clarified how HP would engage with the retained governance model, including participation in the governance board to support reporting, compliance with agreed standards, senior stakeholder alignment and visibility of operational delivery issues.

Implementation was then delegated to a newly appointed Vice President and a project team with the capacity to follow the delivery plan through to completion.

The work identified enterprise-level licence agreements that were not being leveraged across jurisdictions. These opportunities enabled cost savings and cost avoidance where similar services were being purchased by different parts of Deutsche Bank under different pricing arrangements.

Savings and cost-avoidance opportunities were identified across immediate licence renewals within **1–3 months** and a longer **12–18 month renewal roadmap**, based on licence-renewal timing, supplier arrangements and enterprise agreement opportunities.

Longer-term projected savings and cost-avoidance opportunities were identified at approximately **£16.5m in year one**, **£20m in year two** and **£12m in year three**.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This example is relevant to programme recovery because recovery-stage environments often involve inherited complexity, previous failed attempts, fragmented governance, unclear accountability, supplier dependency, poor visibility, regional conflict, weak decision rights, commercial exposure and post-outsource retained-organisation challenges.

The Deutsche Bank example demonstrates troubleshooting and recovery-relevant transformation capability in a regulated global financial-services environment where an earlier attempt had failed to resolve the underlying third-party supplier, contract, software-licence and licence-governance problem, and where a major outsource introduced new retained-organisation obligations, governance requirements, accountability issues and control challenges.

It demonstrates the ability to diagnose prior failure, understand inherited contractual obligations, define a workable retained-organisation operating model, create a global governance model, establish decision-right structures, resolve accountability gaps, define escalation routes, improve supplier, contract and licence visibility, strengthen financial control and design a practical delivery roadmap.

It is not positioned as a stalled programme recovery example in the narrow sense. Its relevance lies in the ability to take ownership of a complex inherited delivery problem, convert unresolved strategic objectives into an implementable transformation model, and establish the governance, accountability, third-party supplier-control, contract-control,

software licence-control, commercial-control, cost-reduction and cost-avoidance mechanisms required to make delivery viable.

Evidence of Outcomes

The Deutsche Bank global supplier governance and licence-control example provides recovery-relevant scale evidence in a global financial-services and investment-banking environment, involving a failed previous transformation, major outsource-driven retained-organisation complexity, supplier-control weakness, licence-control fragmentation, unclear accountability, regional governance conflict, contract-visibility problems and the need to create an implementable global governance model.

The scale indicators below show why this was not a routine supplier-management or licence-management exercise. They evidence the size of the outsource environment, the inherited failed transformation, the global contract and supplier-control complexity, the jurisdictional and language issues, the absence of effective decision rights, the retained-organisation obligations created by the HP outsource, and the practical governance, financial-control and implementation model required to move the situation from unresolved complexity into controlled delivery.

Relevant scale indicators included:

Outsource and Retained-Organisation Scale

- approximately £750m outsource with HP covering service provision, application development, TUPE transfer of staff and novation of several thousand third-party contract service-provider arrangements;
- major outsource environment creating retained-organisation obligations for supplier, contract and licence-control activity;
- retained-organisation complexity following workforce redundancy, transfer of staff to HP under TUPE, transfer of day-to-day supplier-management responsibilities and promotion of new service-tower and business-area owners into newly accountable roles;
- multiple affected service towers, including data centre facilities, Unix, Wintel, provisioning and other service areas;
- outsource arrangement creating new retained-organisation governance, accountability, supplier-control, reporting and operating-model requirements.

Failed Transformation and Inherited Recovery Position

- previous failed attempt to resolve uncoordinated and siloed global software-licence management;
- failed transformation involving unresolved jurisdictional issues across the US, UK, Germany, Singapore and other regions;
- absence of an agreed central governance board;
- inability to define the operating model and processes during the previous attempt;
- difficulty accessing and collating retained third-party contracts;
- lack of a comprehensive RACI;
- absence of a single accountable director;
- conflict between senior directors in different global regions;
- outsource altering the governance, accountability and budget-control landscape and requiring the failed transformation to be revisited;
- intervention and transformation required in parallel because the organisation had to address both inherited failure and pressing new retained-organisation obligations.

Global Supplier, Contract and Licence-Control Complexity

- approximately 7,000 retained third-party contracts requiring improved visibility, control, collation and governance;
- global supplier, contract and licence-management complexity across the US, UK, Germany, Singapore and other jurisdictions;
- supplier, service, contract and licence-control environment crossing multiple regions, languages, budget structures, supplier arrangements and operational ownership models;
- language and contract-collation requirements across more than 39 countries;
- regional and jurisdictional budgetary control issues, with no previous central veto or binding decision authority;
- poor visibility of supplier, contract, service, licence and decision information before the proposed governance model;

- enterprise-level licence agreement opportunities not being leveraged across jurisdictions;
- similar services being purchased by different parts of Deutsche Bank under different pricing arrangements.

Governance, Accountability and Decision-Rights Scale

- governance design involving Directors, Vice Presidents, operational leads, procurement, supplier management, finance, contract management, commercial management and technology stakeholders;
- creation of a global governance model with a single accountable US owner;
- defined escalation routes, decision rights, RACI and board-level operating arrangements;
- single accountable owner in the US with authority to make binding decisions where regional or director-level conflict prevented progress;
- governance model designed to allow global control while accommodating regional and jurisdictional differences;
- proposed governance board covering stakeholder roles, formal decision-making arrangements, escalation routes, financial reporting, supplier and licence-control processes and compliance expectations;
- governance papers, decision records, reporting responsibilities, financial-accountability information and administrative support requirements defined to make the board operate in practice.

HP Supplier Governance and Integration Scale

- HP participation proposed within the global governance board;
- HP governance-board role designed to support reporting, compliance with agreed standards, visibility of delivery issues and senior stakeholder alignment;
- HP participation required because outsourced service provision created integration points and interdependencies with the retained organisation;
- retained organisation and outsourced provider required a shared governance route for reporting, standards compliance, issue visibility and alignment.

Operating Model, Process and Tooling Scale

- transformation programme blueprint and approach defined;
- rationale, governance framework, operating model, processes, risk controls, financial controls, RACI, escalation paths, decision rights and roadmap defined;
- retained-organisation supplier, contract and licence-control model designed to be workable in practice;
- minimum criteria for obtaining new service providers defined;
- contract-collation requirements defined;
- tooling requirements identified to store supplier, service, contract, licence and decision information;
- licence control initially managed through a consolidated spreadsheet model;
- intention to reproduce the licence-control information into a relational database once the information model and control requirements were sufficiently understood.

Implementation and Executive Approval Scale

- implementable delivery roadmap created rather than a policy-only governance proposal;
- roadmap gave the newly accountable Director assurance and visibility;
- roadmap gave the accountable Vice President and project implementation team a practical route for turning the model into operational governance, supplier-control, licence-control, reporting and financial-control activity;
- proposed model presented to the accountable US director;
- proposed model approved in its entirety without challenge;
- implementation responsibility delegated to a newly appointed Vice President and project team.

Savings, Cost-Avoidance and Financial-Control Scale

- enterprise-level licence agreements identified that were not being leveraged across jurisdictions;
- cost savings and cost-avoidance opportunities identified where similar services were being purchased under different pricing arrangements;
- savings and cost-avoidance opportunities identified across immediate licence renewals within one to three months;
- longer 12-to-18-month renewal roadmap identified based on licence-renewal timing, supplier arrangements and enterprise agreement opportunities;
- longer-term projected savings and cost-avoidance opportunities identified at approximately £16.5m in year one, £20m in year two and £12m in year three;
- financial-control mechanisms defined to improve visibility of supplier, contract, licence and budget accountability.

How Bentley Moore Executive Helps

Bentley Moore Executive helps organisations recover programme control by providing independent, delivery-focused intervention across the areas that typically cause programme deterioration, delivery slippage, cost escalation, governance weakness, supplier underperformance and loss of executive confidence.

Support may include:

Programme Assessment, Recovery Feasibility and Root Cause

- rapid assessment of programme status, delivery confidence, recovery feasibility and recovery options;
- assessment of delivery plans, milestones, critical path, dependencies, risks, unresolved issues, RAID controls and workstream alignment;
- identification of root causes behind slippage, cost escalation, weak delivery confidence, supplier underperformance or stakeholder concern;
- assessment of expected benefits, benefits realisation risk and whether intended outcomes remain achievable under the current plan;

Governance, Assurance, Reporting and Executive Control

- review of programme governance, delivery assurance, reporting, controls, escalation routes and decision-making structures;

- executive-level reporting improvement, including clearer delivery status, risk visibility, recovery assumptions and decision points;
- stakeholder alignment, executive advisory support and decision-support where leadership confidence, supplier tension or unclear accountability is affecting recovery;
- support for executive decisions on whether to continue, reset, re-plan, recover, pause or close activity where the current delivery model is no longer viable;

Supplier, Transition and Delivery Dependency Control

- review of supplier, service integrator, systems integrator and delivery-partner performance, accountability and dependency control;
- review of supplier exit, onboarding, service transition and multi-supplier dependency risks where supplier change is affecting delivery control;
- assessment of business readiness, operational readiness, service transition readiness and BAU transition planning;

Operating Model, Commercial Exposure and Recovery Action

- review of operating model, accountability model and delivery model viability where organisational design, role ownership or governance arrangements are contributing to programme failure;
- assessment of commercial exposure, cost escalation, benefits confidence and the continuing viability of the current delivery model;
- recovery planning, programme reset, re-planning, stabilisation support and practical intervention to restore delivery control;
- practical recommendations to restore control, strengthen governance, improve delivery confidence and regain delivery momentum.

Bentley Moore Executive's focus is to help leadership establish what is happening, why delivery control has weakened, what needs to change, which risks require escalation, what decisions are needed and what recovery route is realistically available.

Programme recovery support is shaped around what is required to restore control and can include an independent programme review, delivery assurance review, programme health check or programme rescue assessment where leadership needs a clearer view of why delivery is slipping, what is causing amber-red or red status, and which recovery options are realistic

Why Bentley Moore Executive

Bentley Moore Executive is positioned for programme recovery situations where organisations need experienced, independent and practical intervention, rather than generic consulting support or additional reporting activity.

The firm brings direct experience across complex transformation, governance implementation, supplier-led delivery, service transition, SIAM, programme recovery, commercial control, executive advisory and recovery-relevant troubleshooting environments.

Bentley Moore Executive is particularly relevant where:

- delivery confidence has deteriorated;
- a programme has moved to amber-red or red status, or requires recovery, rescue, turnaround or stabilisation support;
- senior stakeholders require an independent view of the real programme position;
- troubleshooting and root-cause diagnosis are needed to understand why delivery control has weakened;
- governance is not providing sufficient control, assurance or escalation discipline;
- programme direction has drifted, delivery focus has weakened or scope creep is affecting progress;
- supplier performance, service integrator performance or delivery-partner dependency is affecting delivery confidence;
- supplier conflict, contested accountability or unclear responsibility is obstructing recovery;
- programme reporting is unclear, inconsistent, disputed or not giving executives a reliable view of risk and progress;
- stakeholders no longer agree on the true delivery position, recovery options or delivery feasibility;
- commercial exposure, cost escalation or weakened benefits confidence is affecting programme viability;
- operating-model, accountability, decision-right or delivery-model weaknesses are contributing to delivery failure;

- service transition, SIAM, supplier exit, onboarding or multi-supplier dependencies are affecting delivery control;
- recovery requires both strategic judgement and practical delivery control;
- leadership needs executive advisory support, stakeholder alignment or executive mediation to move from disagreement to decision;
- leadership needs a clear route from diagnosis to stabilisation, recovery planning and controlled intervention;
- executive decisions are needed on whether to continue, recover, reset, re-plan, pause or close activity where the current delivery model may no longer be viable.

The value of Bentley Moore Executive lies in combining executive advisory insight and capability with practical delivery-side experience.

Support includes an independent programme review, delivery assurance review, programme health check or programme rescue assessment where leadership needs a clearer view of why delivery is slipping, what is causing amber-red or red status, and which recovery options are realistic.

This allows troubleshooting and programme recovery situations to be assessed across organisation, governance, reporting, delivery control, supplier dependency, commercial exposure, accountability, processes, technology, operational readiness and executive decision-making, with a focus on the practical intervention required to stabilise delivery, strengthen executive and delivery assurance, restore confidence and regain delivery momentum.

Need Programme Recovery Support?

Next Steps

If delivery is falling behind, issues are compounding and confidence is collapsing, decisive intervention is needed. Without it, cost increases, risk exposure grows, recovery is delayed, decisions become more complicated and control becomes harder to regain.

Bentley Moore Executive can provide an independent assessment of the current position, recovery options and the practical route back to control.

Contact Bentley Moore Executive to discuss your situation.

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