

7/24/2020

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Working Paper
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Addendum:
Remake the Police

a comprehensive strategy for police reform

**The Minneapolis Police Department Requires a Total Makeover
as do many other departments around the nation**

Walter McClure

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What Does Good Policing Look Like?
How Do We Get There?

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Addendum

Remake The Police

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The Minneapolis Police Department Requires A Total Makeover

What Does Good Policing Look Like?

How Do We Get There?

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Introduction

Most Americans have little feel for what good policing is, and how superior it is to current policing in most of the country, superior on reducing crime, solving crime, de-escalating force, and building trust between police and community, including communities of color. This paper will explain what good policing is and how to get there. We want people not only to support their police but also to demand reform that rewards good policing and ends bad policing.

The way to get there [described more fully in a previous strategy paper] is a total makeover of the Minneapolis Police Force, comprised of two steps plus all actions necessary to carry out these steps:

- Totally remake the *approach* from “warrior policing” to “procedural justice policing.”
- Totally remake the *personnel* by replacing all warrior-minded officers with officers committed to the procedural justice approach.

In fact, in 2012 using a very similar strategy, the abysmally performing Camden NJ police force got just such a total makeover with impressive success: crime rates fell significantly, the solved crime rate increased significantly, and community trust and cooperation with police rose significantly. The new procedural justice approach proved far superior to the old warrior approach on every dimension of policing performance, notably saving both citizen and police lives.

The Camden experience gives us ordinary citizens insight how good policing operates and how superior it is, showing real-world examples how it de-escalates unnecessary force wherever possible, engages in consistently fair encounters unbiased by race and class, and operates with equal concern for the lives of citizens and suspects as well as officers themselves ... taking patience and pains that not only our police but “everyone comes home safe and alive at night”. All citizens, including citizens of color, can feel safe and supportive of their police.

Therefore this addendum 1) summarizes Camden’s experience; 2) gives examples of force de-escalation in action there; 3) summarizes points from Camden and elsewhere that seem germane to the strategy; and finally 4) incorporates these points into recommendations for implementing the strategy in Minneapolis.

Good policing will not emerge by exhortation and tinkering, it will only arise as in Camden, by total makeover. I believe we can accomplish this kind of makeover here with results as good or

better. It will be a revolution from bad to good policing. Our officers can then be the excellent, courageous guardians protecting and serving us that good officers wish to be, and to whom we all can deservedly give our wholehearted gratitude, cooperation, and support.

The Case of Camden

Summary

Starting in 2013 under Chief J. Scott Thomson, Camden NJ accomplished a total makeover of its police department, including makeover of its policing approach and makeover of its police personnel to remove and replace warrior-minded officers. The results have been widely reported (see sources). It demonstrates that such a policing makeover strategy is both feasible and immensely effective. Below is how the Chief himself describes it.

Chief J. Scott Thomson:

I started as a police officer in Camden in 1994. Camden is a city in New Jersey, across the Delaware River from Philadelphia, that is almost entirely black and Latino, and it had extremely high rates of poverty and crime. The department I came up in was largely apathetic and struggled with corruption. Early on, the police union was almost all older white guys. They wielded power through the collective-bargaining agreement and by collecting dues, which gave them the ability to build a war chest. They thought they could outlast any politician or police leader. I became chief in 2008 mainly because I was next in a fast-moving line ... we'd had five chiefs in five years. They looked at me and said, 'Well, he looks like he won't get indicted in the next six months — he'll do.'

Camden had one of the highest murder rates in the country. The rate for solving murders was only 17 percent, and there were open-air drug markets all over the city. There was borderline hatred between the community and the police. It was very hard to make any progress.

In 2011, when Camden was in a fiscal crisis, the state threatened huge layoffs to the police force unless the union made major concessions to the contract. The union refused, and nearly half of the department was laid off. Over the next two years, the Republican governor, Chris Christie, worked with Democrats in the county and city governments to disband the city Police Department and start a new county force.

So we started from scratch. We let every city police officer go and created a new department with new rules in 2013. By agreement with Camden County, the city ceased to fund its department and instead paid the county to police the city of Camden. We required all officers to apply as new hires (most officers from the old force got jobs, but not all) and committed to a new relationship between Camden's police and its citizens, around 95% of whom are minorities

Any officer who wanted to be considered for the new force, including me, had to fill out a 50-page application, take psychological and physical tests and pass an interview process that was specifically created from community focus-group surveys about what community residents wanted in their police officers. Base compensation remained comparable, but initially, salary enhancements like shift-differential and specialized unit pay were restructured and certain

benefits were reduced. Although the police officers' union has since returned, initially the new officers came on without a union contract.

But about 50 hard-line union folks decided not to reapply. They encouraged people to follow them so that a county force couldn't be formed. Fortunately, most officers did not follow the union advice. Even more fortunately, these 50 folks who were the impediment to change selected themselves out of the hiring process. I was able to accomplish in three days what I couldn't in three years. That allowed me to reset the culture.

As chief, I was no longer bound by the old work rules. As a new department, our political support was unprecedented. When the union reappeared, I enjoyed a partnership with leaders there who cared about the community as much as the welfare of their member officers. We were building culture as opposed to changing it. Although it took us more than a year to return to our pre-2011 staffing levels, the initial increase of about 50 additional officers enabled us to instantly boost our presence in the community. I could now accomplish in a few days policy and operational changes — things like codifying the requirement that officers de-escalate encounters before using force — that would have taken years in the old department.

Cops prevent violence. But they aren't the only ones who can do it.

We knew that doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results was insanity, so we tried new approaches: Commanders were forbidden from using the phrase “we've always done it this way,” because we now operated under the assumption that the old way was wrong. We deployed ice cream trucks and held block parties to build trust between officers and the residents of the neighborhoods they patrolled. The ideology that underpinned these strategies was to create safe environments by getting people to flood the streets they once abandoned. Residents became much more willing to share information that made us smarter in reducing crime. We enlisted former drug dealers returning home from prison to share with kids how to avoid some of the mistakes that they had made.

Instead of a patrol division solely focused on responding to calls, *every* cop became a community officer: it was understood that their job responsibilities also included building relationships. New officers were required to knock on doors and introduce themselves to residents. How could we address people's concerns if we didn't first know what they were? An officer who spent three to four hours at headquarters processing a meaningless offense wasn't advancing safety or trust. But an officer who is visible and approachable — one who eschews polarizing tactics — significantly alters the chemistry of that environment for the better and creates the peace dividend police desperately need today.

Of course, we used the latest technology to ensure our officers were working efficiently and well — real-time data that I could remotely monitor 24/7 to track officers' activity and location. We decided that deterring crime was more important than making arrests, and that is how we eliminated about 150 open-air drug markets: You can't sell drugs with a uniformed cop standing on the same corner.

As we got to know our neighbors better, we shifted from enforcing the law *upon* them to upholding the law *with* them. Part of this was about eliminating counterproductive policing routines: I directed internal affairs to investigate the department's top five ticket-writing cops each month, because handing a hefty traffic fine to someone who's scraping by can be life-altering, and not in a way that protects the community. Our preference was to issue warnings. The state American Civil Liberties Union chapter and community residents explained that some of our low-level-offense enforcements were making things worse. We listened. Residents responded with even more communication and assisted us to increase gun seizures by 185 percent within the first few months. As citizens trusted us more, they shared more intelligence with us to make their streets safer. This helped us lift our murder-solve rate from a dismal 16% to 61 %.

We developed de-escalation training based upon the Police Executive Research Forum's ICAT principles for Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics. Sanctity of human life and the Hippocratic ethos of "first, do no harm" were guiding principles. We taught officers how to use restraint in incidents in which deadly force may have been legally justified but wasn't generally necessary if they were smart. And when that last resort was essential, we rendered medical aid immediately after an officer-involved shooting and transported the wounded suspects to the trauma center to save their lives.

Protests focus on over-policing. But under-policing is also deadly.

There's a raging debate right now about "defunding" the police, but it's missing the point. Communities need police. What they don't need is a cop with a warrior's psyche and an occupier's mentality. Camden's transformation wasn't about getting rid of police or reducing their authority. It was about increasing our legitimacy by convincing citizens that we understood our role. We didn't reinvent policing so much as reset it to what it always should have been.

Policing works in a democratic society only when it has the consent of the people. The old Camden city police department had forgotten that. Many departments in this country have long assumed that their legitimacy is automatic and that the problem is with the public, not us. But citizens' disdain can change only if we change first.

Camden is not a utopia. There are still huge social inequities there, and before I left last year, we fired and prosecuted a cop for excessive force. But it's far less violent. Homicides have fallen by more than 50 percent, and the rate for solving them is more than 60 percent, because people are more willing to trust and talk to the police.

Examples of Police De-escalation and Service In Action in Camden

Many people who strongly support the police fear de-escalation hampers police and puts them at risk. This is false, the opposite is true. Right-wing propaganda attempting to politicize the issue by such claims is harming the police and the nation. De-escalation not only saves police lives, it notably also saves victims and suspects lives. And it builds trust with the community who begin to cooperate in preventing and solving crimes, which significantly drops the crime rate and risk for both community and police. Police never lose control or authority but exercise great

discretion and patience to avoid all unnecessary violence. Here are examples of police de-escalation and service in Camden:

Source: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/02/nyregion/camden-nj-police-shootings.html>

“The old police mantra was make it home safely,” said Tyrrell Bagby, 25, an affable second-generation Camden police officer. “Now we’re being taught not only should we make it home safely, but so should the victim and the suspect.” Officer Bagby has saved 22 lives since joining the force in 2014 by administering naloxone, a drug that reverses opioid overdoses.

An early sign that Chief Thomson’s message was taking hold among his officers came on Nov. 9, 2015, when a 48-year-old man walked into a Crown Fried Chicken, behaved menacingly toward customers and employees, brandished a steak knife and left. Outside, officers ordered him to drop the knife, according to video from police body cameras. But the man began walking away, slashing the knife through the air as he went.

For several minutes, the officers formed a cordon around the man and walked with him for a few blocks, trying to clear traffic ahead and periodically instructing him to drop the knife. The crisis ended when the man did just that. Had the episode taken place a year before, “we would more than likely have deployed deadly force and moved on,” Chief Thomson said. Few videos like it have emerged in the annals of American policing.

Please watch *Man with a knife incident...*CreditVideo by CamdenCountyPolice

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=YtVUMT9P8iw&feature=youtu.be>

The chief said he had stressed to his officers that the department “does not treat repositioning as retreating,” and that backing up to put a car between a suspect and an officer “is not an act of cowardice.”

Another lifesaving initiative in Camden, actually a mandate, is for officers to drive gunshot victims to a hospital if waiting for an ambulance would cause a delay. The policy, known as “scoop and go,” was modeled after a longstanding Philadelphia policy. But in much of the country, officers view picking up victims as the ambulance crews’ job.

Sgt. Angel Nieves, 45, a 17-year Camden officer, said the policy “stunned” him when it was put into effect in November 2015. He had been taught to “keep your distance — you don’t know what these guys have,” alluding to H.I.V. Then he thought of “what happened in places like Ferguson,” where officers had left Mr. Brown’s body on the street, provoking outrage. “In light of what happened there,” he said, “any department that doesn’t go with a ‘scoop and go’ policy is just asking for it” — that is, asking for trouble.

A media campaign publicizing examples like these in action might be the best way to convey to politicians, police, and the public the dismal performance of warrior policing and great superiority of procedural justice policing on every aspect of policing performance for both the police and public safety. It would help convey the reality of what good policing is and can be.

Germane Points from Camden and elsewhere (*see sources, end of section)

- The Center for Policing Equity worked with the Minneapolis Police Department from 2016 to 2018. Over the past five years there, the police have used force against black

people at seven times the rate it has been used against white people. Our trainings were designed to help the police recognize interactions that are likely to result in discriminatory behavior, or undermine trust, and practice not to do that. And later we also used analytics to put resources back into the community. For example, in North Minneapolis, the police were giving out a lot of tickets for broken taillights, so we recommended they give out vouchers to get those lights fixed instead.

- But the Minneapolis police have struggled for a long time with pockets of resistance to those kinds of changes. One terrible lesson of George Floyd’s death is that we don’t have mechanisms to stop terrible officers from doing terrible things on a given shift.
- Chief Medaria Arradondo, the city’s first black police chief, who took over in 2017, quickly fired Derek Chauvin and the three officers who were with him. But for years, complaints of misconduct and excessive use of force rarely resulted in discipline. Chauvin had a record of at least 17 misconduct complaints over his 19 years in the department, yet he was a training officer for new recruits, including two of the officers present at Floyd’s death.
- The Supreme Court has given the police a lot of leeway to use force. In 1989, in the case Graham v. Connor, the court held that officers could use force if doing so was “objectively reasonable” from their point of view in the moment.
- The Supreme Court standard allows for a lot of situations that should never develop. Think about the mentally ill individual who refuses to drop a knife when a police officer tells him to. The law as the Supreme Court defines it allows the officer to advance on him and then shoot him — not because someone is necessarily in danger but because the person didn’t comply with the officer’s verbal commands. But why advance in the first place if it’s not necessary? How can any industry be considered legitimate, professional, or trusted if it holds itself to only the absolute lowest permissible standard?
- In 2019 when I was chief of the Camden police force, we adopted a use-of-force policy with the help of Barry Friedman, a law professor at New York University, and the Policing Project he started there. The policy mandates that the police de-escalate a conflict, use force only as a last resort, intervene to stop excessive force and report violations of law and policy by other officers.
- Within a Police Department, culture eats policy for breakfast. You can have a perfectly worded policy, but it’s meaningless if it just exists on paper. You get trained in it when you’re a recruit in your three to six months at the police academy. But in too many departments, officers never receive more training on the policy or even see it again unless they get in trouble. They are then befuddled by being held to account for behaviors that regularly exist among their peers, and they feel scapegoated.
- At the Police Executive Research Forum, we released a survey in 2016 that found that agencies spend a median of 58 hours on training for recruits on how to use a gun and 49 hours on defensive tactics, but they spend about only eight hours on de-escalation and crisis intervention.
- To change the culture around the use of force, you have to have continuous training, systems of accountability and consequences. In Camden, when an officer uses force in the field, supervisors review the body-cam footage. The following day, internal affairs and a training officer also review it and either challenge or concur with the supervisors’

findings. If they see something wrong, they bring the officer in and go over the tape. If the supervisors had approved something unacceptable, they, too, are held to account.

- A member of the Minneapolis City Council, Steve Fletcher, tweeted about the city's police union as an obstacle to change. "They distort hard-earned labor laws to defend indefensible behaviors," he wrote. Protection for the police, through collective-bargaining agreements or state laws lobbied for by unions, often "exceeds that provided to workers in other industries," In Minneapolis, the union president, Bob Kroll, followed a common path when he defended the officers involved in Floyd's death and lashed out at protesters as a "terrorist movement."
- The whole idea that the police should be able to unionize in the first place needs to be interrogated. One study shows that when sheriffs' unions were allowed to bargain collectively in Florida in the early 2000s, based on a State Supreme Court ruling, complaints about violent misconduct rose 40 percent.
- Investigations and the discipline of officers — basic on-the-job accountability — should not be within the purview of collective-bargaining agreements between police unions and cities. One big problem is that cities cannot negotiate a new union contract unless the union votes to approve it, so they're stuck with old contracts, which include concessions they've made to the unions on accountability and oversight over decades. We can't hold the police accountable for use of force or misconduct if the unions continue to have veto power over change.
- Last year it became clear that the officer who shot and killed Philando Castile in a suburb of St. Paul during a routine traffic stop had gone to a warrior-type seminar. The chief said officers who went to these trainings outside work would be disciplined. And then the union president, Bob Kroll, offered this training free for his members.
- Arradondo wanted to work with us on reforms. He was one of five black officers who sued the department for racial discrimination in 2007. One person they named in that suit is the current head of the police union, Bob Kroll. When Arradondo's suit was settled in 2009, the two sides didn't get together and hold hands. So that's not a unified culture. And if you have a strong union with a union head who says, "We're not doing any of this because it's bunk," the chief of police can't change the culture.
- Some cops valued the secondary jobs they got, working in security for private businesses or road construction on the side, more than their primary job of police work. They could make an extra \$2,000 a week. Guys who worked many hours would use their police job to get rest. New Jersey addressed that problem and in 2013 tightened state oversight. It has been an issue in Minneapolis. A city audit there last year showed that officers working outside jobs were regularly exceeding the maximum hours they were allowed for the week. In 1994, when the mayor tried to tighten the rules to increase oversight, the union sued.
- The Justice Department can negotiate an agreement with a city that contains a lot of reforms around discriminatory policing, use of force, accountability, supervision and training. The agreement is filed in court with a federal judge, sometimes as a consent decree, which has more teeth for enforcement and has often run for five years. The consent decree forces the hand of the union and the rank and file. It can create the political will, over years, to actually see reforms through. That sustained focus really matters. (But in a TV interview in June, Attorney General William Barr said, "I don't

think that the law-enforcement system is systemically racist.” The Justice Department will investigate George Floyd’s death, but Barr said he doesn’t think a larger pattern-or-practice investigation is currently warranted in Minneapolis.) From 1994 to 2017, there were 69 investigations into patterns of practice in Police Departments, under both Republican and Democratic presidents, which resulted in 40 consent decrees or settlement agreements. But the Justice Department during the Trump administration has abandoned this work.

- The elemental first step is to show that law and order applies equally to the police. So most immediate, we need accountability for the death of George Floyd. Increasing the charges to second-degree murder for Derek Chauvin, and also charging the other three officers involved, was really important. Most of the time, there is unrest, and then there is a quick move to convene a grand jury, and people think there is no way that they couldn’t hold these officers accountable. And time and time again, as in the cases of Mike Brown and Eric Garner, grand juries have decided not to indict.
- The United States spends more on public safety than almost all its peer countries and much less, relatively speaking, on social services. In Los Angeles this month, Black Lives Matter activists and members of the City Council succeeded in getting the mayor to propose moving \$150 million of the Police Department’s nearly \$2 billion operating budget to health and job programs. (The police union said the mayor had “lost his damn mind” and warned that spending cuts would result in more crime.) In New York, more than 230 current and former members of Mayor Bill de Blasio’s staff signed an open letter pointing out that the police budget has grown since he took office by almost \$1 billion (to a total of \$6 billion) and demanded that \$1 billion be reallocated to “essential social services,” like housing support and health care, as a coalition of advocacy groups are urging.
- It’s not just about how black communities are policed, and what reforms are required, but also about why we’ve invested exclusively in a criminalization model for public safety, instead of investing in housing, jobs, health care, education for black communities, and fighting structural inequality. Budgets are moral documents, reflecting priorities and values.
- In every community meeting that I went to, folks were not just talking to me about concerns about police abuse. They wanted the Justice Department to fix the schools, to fix public transportation so they could get to their jobs more easily. Policing problems — police violence, overpolicing — were often the tip of the spear. About 90 percent of our survey respondents said that the No.1 issue facing them, and keeping them up at night, is that their wages are too low to support a family.
- In a 2016 survey by the Pew Research Center, black people were much less likely than white people to say that the police do an excellent or good job. Yet in a 2019 survey for Vox, they were almost as likely to support hiring more officers.
- Imagine that you have a tool chest for solving social problems. It gives you options. Then you lose the tool of mental-health resources. You lose the tool of public education. They take out the tool of job placement. And then all you’ve got left is this one rusty hammer. That’s policing. Right now, the only money flowing into some black communities is law-enforcement money. But there are also a bunch of white people saying, “Let’s defund the police,” because they like the police as an enemy, but then when it comes to investing in

black communities, they are silent. Simply defunding the police cannot be a legacy of this moment. I want to hear about investing in black communities more than I want to hear about defunding.

- I've been saying for years that the No.1 thing you can do to help law enforcement is to call them less often. But I'm concerned about the slogan "Defund the Police." It's so much easier, time after time, for white people to take money out of communities than it is to put it back into communities, particularly when those communities are black.

***Sources**

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Takeaways for a Minneapolis Strategy.

The new State Compromise ... teach de-escalation and ban chokeholds ... is a worthy start but won't get us there. First chokeholds are not the problem, it is warrior-minded officers; they can kill or brutalize with guns or physical force. Second, de-escalation training has already been tried by the Department and failed; it was undermined by a warrior-minded union and officers. So what will work to get us to good policing?

- 1) Nothing will work until all warrior-minded officers are removed from the force.
- 2) De-escalation training is only part of the 'procedural justice' policing approach. The complete package is necessary. These two steps taken together can get us to the good policing we see in Camden, and that we aspire to here.

A. Remake the policing approach:

Adopting a formal new policy specifying in detail the procedural justice approach and rejecting the warrior approach will be the comparatively easy part. Getting officers to commit to and practice it by changing from a warrior culture to a procedural justice culture will be the hard part. But it is necessary that the City and Department formally adopt and have clear unambiguous written statements of the procedural justice policy and associated practices and disciplinary rules.

The Minneapolis Charter presently gives the Mayor complete authority over the police department, including appointing the chief and setting policy. But that is theoretical policy. In practice, it appears that the Mayor has the responsibility but not the authority necessary.

-- The Mayor and Chief need to agree and adopt a formal procedural justice policy, compatible disciplinary policy, and a continual training policy. These policies should be trumpeted loudly to the city and courts and arbitrators, so there is no doubt what the policy is.

-- The policy should not rely on any past precedents including union contracts and arbitration decisions. It should be the ideal that the City and Police Department wish for themselves and aspire to.

-- Excellent experience-tested and researched formal documents and manuals spelling out procedural justice policy, training and discipline are available, as well as consulting assistance from excellent organizations, including among others:

The Center for Policing Equity
<https://policingequity.org/>

National Initiative for Building Trust and Justice
<https://trustandjustice.org/resources/intervention/procedural-justice>

-- Every potential obstacle to adopting and enforcing the new policy should be investigated and strategies developed to remove or overcome them. For example, if the union contract does not allow dismissal for violating explicitly stated policy, and the union has the right to veto any change in the contract, then the contract must be overturned by whatever means are necessary, because policing policy is not properly a matter for union contracts. Whatever stops must be pulled out at the local or state judicial or legislative level must be sought. For example, if the union refuses to voluntarily remove policy matters from the contract, the City can offer it a choice: remove the any obstacles to the new approach in the contract, or the department will be disbanded and all officers let go while a new department is being formed, as was done in Camden.

B. Remake the officer personnel

The present force must get a complete makeover, removing as rapidly as possible all warrior-minded officers opposed, and retaining veteran officers and adding new hires committed to the new approach. How to do this is the hardest problem.

Culture eats policy for breakfast. The only way to change the culture is remove all officers opposed to the new policy and retain and/or hire only those committed to it.

-- The biggest problem is how to remove all warrior officers opposed to the procedural justice approach and unwilling to wholeheartedly commit to making the new policy work. These officers have no place in good policing, and there must be a mechanism to permanently remove them from the force.

-- There appear two approaches:

a) Act within the present department, removing opposed officers by asking for voluntary resignations, and by dismissal of any remainder who refuse resignation when they willfully violate the new policy.

b) Create a new department: disband the present department letting all officers go and start a new department by whatever legal maneuver appears best, to which officers can reapply, and then hire only those committed to the new approach.

-- To pursue the strategy within the present Police Department, we need answers to what are the obstacles to the makeover strategy, and how to remove them. Since the City Charter gives full authority theoretically to the Mayor and Chief, what presently prevents them in practice from:

- acting on complaints and discipline recommendations of the Review Board?
- discipline against the severe abuse of outside job hours?
- dismissing officers from the force who violate Department policy?

- firing any officer taking outside warrior training seminars, absolutely violating the Chief's policy against any warrior training?
- firing the union head from the police force for offering free warrior training through the union, an act of gross insubordination to the Chief's policy?

Presumably the Mayor and Chief have policy authority under the present police union contract to make all these moves. But they have not done so. Why? As Camden Chief Thomson remarked, culture eats policy for breakfast. Practical people say it is almost impossible to fire people in practice in the present system. Unless all external parties ... arbitrators, courts ... get on board to help remove warrior officers, reform cannot happen withing the Department.

-- To create a new department, complete detailed plans must be in hand before disbanding the present department: where it will be housed, its budget and funding source, its functions if broader than just policing (it need not be), who will run it, etc. There must be no hiatus in effective policing during any transition. In the meantime, everything possible should be done to move the strategy within the department.

-- Both approaches require a screening mechanism to know which officers to retain or hire, and which to dismiss and not rehire. Camden used a 50-page questionnaire, which can be used in either approach to identify officers not wanted on the remade force. This looks like a very useful tool. It should be made a matter of policy that all officers new or veteran should have to take the questionnaire. This will help management identify potentially outstanding officers and potentially troublesome ones who should be closely monitored and if necessary dismissed permanently from the force.

-- Training should be ongoing, 50% in the use of force when necessary, and 50% in the de-escalation of all unnecessary force and interacting properly with community members to inspire friendship and trust.

-- Training by debriefing: Besides formal training courses, constant debriefing when force has been used (the debriefing procedure in Camden provides a tested example) looks useful for training. Every use of force gets debriefed to see if there were better ways to handle it by de-escalation. The whole force can benefit by these debriefings. Debriefing should be cooperative and positive between supervisors and the involved officers, not a matter of blaming, with conscientious officers referred to training to improve skills. On the other hand, if it becomes clear an officer is engaging in willful escalation, then the first step is discipline, spelled out in policy, and the next step is dismissal.

-- It is often difficult to convict an officer because of the unreasonable latitude of current law. But conviction is less the object than permanent removal of an uncooperative warrior officer from the force. This should be possible because the City and Dept. have made clear in writing and by publicity what the new policy is. And part of policy is that any willful violation, such as unjustified force, is cause for dismissal, even if not illegal.

-- Because it will take time and expense to 1) train the remade force in procedural justice methods, and 2) to fund actions and functions to serve the community and build relationships

between officers and the community, *this is not the time to defund or underfund the police*. The present crime and murder rate in communities of color shows the result of underpolicing.

C. Media Campaign

If the City cannot generate sufficient powerful political support to implement the new policy, then reform is dead. Very few of the public or politicians know what a reformed police force looks like and how it performs. To generate strong political and public support for the makeover, a skilled media campaign could show how officers in Camden and elsewhere apply de-escalation and community cooperative methods, and how this reduces crime, raises solved crime rates, and gives the community confidence in the police. This can show the public what is possible and what the city should be aspiring to, and embarrass us that our police force is presently so retrograde and out of touch with quality policing.

A media campaign can help show the battle is not against the police, it is for the police. The battle is for good policing and good police. It is against bad policing and bad police. A good media campaign will make the difference dramatically clear. Police risk their lives to serve and protect us. A good media campaign would help us know the difference and give wholehearted support to good police and policing, wholehearted opposition to bad police and policing. This may help politicians and the public understand that mindless, blind coddling of unduly violent and racially biased warrior-dominated police departments is not good for the police, the public, or public safety. □

About the author: Dr. Walter McClure, Ph.D., is chair and a senior fellow of the Center for Policy Design.

About the Center: The Center for Policy Design is a non-profit, non-partisan policy research and design organization based in Saint Paul, Minnesota and working nationally, that using the theory and methods of Large System Architecture develops and helps policymakers apply system redesign strategies for health care, public education, and other large systems in need of improved performance. [website: centerforpolicy.org]