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Clerk of the Court
Superior Court of CA
County of Santa Clara

24CV444501
By: fbryant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

GREGORY FERNANDEZ, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24CV444501

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA SETTLEMENT

This is a putative class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") action. Plaintiff Gregory Fernandez alleges that defendant Performance Systems Integration, Inc. committed various wage and hour violations.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for final approval of settlement, which is unopposed. As discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the operative first amended complaint ("FAC"), Plaintiff was employed as an hourly paid, non-exempt employee from approximately November 2016 to August 2023 as a Service Technician and Lead Fire Alarm Installation Technician at their Mountain View facility. (FAC, ¶ 4.) Defendant failed to: pay for all time worked including

overtime and minimum wages; maintain accurate and complete payroll records; provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof; timely pay wages; provide safety devices; provide written notice of the material terms of employment; and reimburse for necessary business expenses. (FAC, ¶¶ 16-28.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff initiated this action on August 2, 2024 and the operative FAC was deemed filed and served on April 8, 2026, and it alleges the following causes of action: (1) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 511, and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime); (2) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, and 1198 (Unpaid Minimum Wages); (3) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512(a), 516, and 1198 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods); (4) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 516, and 1198 (Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods); (5) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226(a), 1174(d), and 1198 (Non-Compliant Wage Statements and Failure to Maintain Payroll Records); (6) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 (Wages Not Timely Paid Upon Termination); (7) Violation of California Labor Code § 204 (Failure to Timely Pay Wages During Employment); (8) Violation of California Labor Code § 2802 (Unreimbursed Business Expenses); (9) Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.* (Unlawful Business Practices); and (10) Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (Unfair Business Practices); and (11) Penalties Pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Representative Claim). On April 13, 2026, the Court issued its order which granted Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of class action and PAGA settlement.

Plaintiff now seeks final approval of the settlement, approval of attorneys' fees and costs, and approval of the class representative enhancement award.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

A. Class Action

Generally, "questions whether a [class action] settlement was fair and reasonable, whether notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court's broad

discretion." (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234–235 (*Wershba*), disapproved of on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260.)

> In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, such as the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

(*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 244–245, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

In general, the most important factor is the strength of the plaintiffs' case on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement. (See *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 (*Kullar*).) But the trial court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of relevant factors, depending on the circumstances of each case. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) The trial court must examine the "proposed settlement agreement to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." (*Ibid.*, citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court also must independently confirm that "the consideration being received for the release of the class members' claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) Of course, before performing its analysis the trial court must be "provided with basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise." (*Id.* at pp. 130, 133.)

B. PAGA

Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (l)(2) provides that "[t]he superior court shall review and approve any settlement of any civil action filed pursuant to" PAGA. The court's review "ensur[es] that any negotiated resolution is fair to those affected." (*Williams v. Superior Court* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.) Seventy-five percent of any penalties recovered under PAGA go to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), leaving the remaining twenty-five percent for the aggrieved employees. (*Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 380, overruled on other grounds by *Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana* (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 2940.)

Similar to its review of class action settlements, the Court must "determine independently whether a PAGA settlement is fair and reasonable," to protect "the interests of the public and the LWDA in the enforcement of state labor laws." (*Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.* (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 76–77.) It must make this assessment "in view of PAGA's purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws." (*Id.* at p. 77; see also *Haralson v. U.S. Aviation Servs. Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2019) 383 F. Supp. 3d 959, 971 ["when a PAGA claim is settled, the relief provided for under the PAGA [should] be genuine and meaningful, consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public ...."], quoting LWDA guidance discussed in *O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110 (*O'Connor*).)

The settlement must be reasonable in light of the potential verdict value. (See *O'Connor, supra,* 201 F.Supp.3d at p. 1135 [rejecting settlement of less than one percent of the potential verdict].) But a permissible settlement may be substantially discounted, given that courts often exercise their discretion to award PAGA penalties below the statutory maximum even where a claim succeeds at trial. (See *Viceral v. Mistras Group, Inc.* (N.D. Cal., Oct. 11, 2016, No. 15-CV-02198-EMC) 2016 WL 5907869, at *8–9.)

III. SETTLEMENT CLASS

All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California as a non-exempt employee at any time during the period from August 2, 2020, through July 12, 2025.

Rule 3.769(d) of the California Rules of Court states that "[t]he court may make an order approving or denying certification of a provisional settlement class after [a] preliminary settlement hearing." California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 authorizes certification of a class "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court …."

Section 382 requires the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) an ascertainable class and (2) a well-defined community of interest among the class members. (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (*Sav-On Drug Stores*).) "Other relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward ultimately to prove his or her separate claim to a portion of the total recovery and whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and redress alleged wrongdoing." (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.) The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that class treatment will yield "substantial benefits" to both "the litigants and to the court." (*Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 385.)

In the settlement context, "the court's evaluation of the certification issues is somewhat different from its consideration of certification issues when the class action has not yet settled." (*Luckey v. Superior Court* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 81, 93.) As no trial is anticipated in the settlement-only context, the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted, and the court's review is more lenient in this respect. (*Id.* at pp. 93–94.) But considerations designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions require heightened scrutiny in the settlement-only class context, since the court will lack the usual opportunity to adjust the class as proceedings unfold. (*Id.* at p. 94.)

At preliminary approval, the Court provisionally certified the above-described Class, and it does not find any reasons to depart from that ruling at this time. Consequently, the Court will certify the Class for settlement purposes as requested.

IV. TERMS AND ADMINISTRATION OF SETTLEMENT

The non-reversionary gross settlement amount is $375,000. Attorney's fees of up to one-third of the gross settlement amount ($125,000), litigation costs of up to $25,000, and

administrative costs of up to $7,850. $37,500 will be allocated to PAGA penalties, with 65% ($24,375) paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") and 35% ($13,125) will be distributed, on a pro rata basis, to "Aggrieved Employees" who are defined as "all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California as a non-exempt employee at any time from August 1, 2023, through July 12, 2025." Plaintiff will seek a class representative incentive award in the amount of $10,000.

The net settlement amount—which is estimated to be $169,650—will be allocated to Class Members. The average individual payment will be about $935.22 with the highest payment being $2,885.96. For tax purposes, 10% of each individual Class payment will be allocated as wages and 90% will be located as non-wages. Funds associated with checks uncashed after 180 days will be transmitted to the State Controller's Office, Unclaimed Property Division.

In exchange for settlement, Class Members who do not opt out will release:

> [A]ny and all claims reasonably related to or arising out of the factual allegations pled in the Operative Complaint in the Action or Plaintiff's PAGA Notice, including all claims that have been or could have been pled as wage and hour violations and related penalties and interest under California law, including all claims made and that could have been made in such pleading reasonably related to or arising out of the factual allegations therein during the Class Period.

Aggrieved Employees, who consistent with the statute will not be able to opt out of the PAGA portion of the settlement, will release:

> [A]ll claims for civil penalties, interest, attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and other available relief for violations of PAGA that are reasonably related to or arising out of the factual allegations in the Operative Complaint and/or the PAGA Notice, or could have reasonably been alleged or asserted based on, reasonably related to, or arising out of the facts alleged in the Operative Complaint and/or the PAGA Notice, during the PAGA Period.

The notice period has now been completed. Nicole Bench ("Bench"), a case manager for settlement administrator ILYM Group, Inc. ("ILYM") submitted a declaration in support of the instant motion. On May 13, 2026, ILYM received the class data from defense counsel and on May 28, 2026, ILYM set up a website for Class Members to access relevant court documents. The same day, ILYM mailed the Class notice, in English and Spanish, to 197 Class Members. As of the date of Bench's declaration 13 Class notices were returned as undeliverable. 10 updated addresses were obtained and accordingly re-mailed. Thus, as of the date of Bench's declaration, 3 notice packets have been deemed undeliverable.

The deadline to respond was July 13, 2026. As of the date of Bench's declaration, ILYM has received 0 disputes, 0 objections, and 1 request for exclusion. Consequently, there are 196 participating Class Members, representing 99.49% of the Class. The average individual payment is $935.22, with the highest being $2,885.96 and the lowest being $11.27. The average PAGA payment is $105.85, with the highest being $208.33 and the lowest being $4.08.

Plaintiff requests $7,850 for administration costs. This request is supported by Bench's declaration. Thus, the amount is reasonable and therefore, it is approved.

At the preliminary approval, the Court found that the proposed settlement provides a fair and reasonable compromise to Plaintiff's claims. It finds no reason to depart from these findings now, especially considering that there are no objections. Therefore, the Court finds that the Settlement is fair and reasonable for the purposes of final approval.

V. ATTORNEYS' FEES, LITIGATION COSTS, AND PLAINTIFF'S SERVICE AWARD

Class Counsel seeks a fee award of $125,000 or one-third of the gross settlement amount, which is not an uncommon contingency fee in a wage and hour class action. Class Counsel provides a lodestar figure of $134,810, based on 200 hours at billing rates ranging from $475 to $1,050 per hour, resulting in a negative multiplier of 0.9, which is below the range of multipliers that courts typically approve. (See *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 ["[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher"]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 6 [stating that multipliers ranging from one to four are typical in common fund cases

and citing the court's own survey of large settlements funding a range of 0.6-19.6, with most (20 to 24, or 83%) from 1.0-4.0 and a bare majority (13 of 24, or 54%) in the 1.5-3.0 range"].)

"While the percentage method has been generally approved in common fund cases, courts have sought to ensure the percentage fee is reasonable by refining the choice of a percentage or by checking the percentage result against the lodestar-multiplier calculation." (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 495 (*Laffitte*).) Applying the latter approach,

> [T]he percentage-based fee will typically be larger than the lodestar based fee. Assuming that one expects rough parity between the results of the percentage method and the lodestar method, the difference between the two computed fees will be attributable solely to a multiplier that has yet to be applied. Stated another way, the ratio of the percentage-based fee to the lodestar-based fee implies a multiplier, and that implied multiplier can be evaluated for reasonableness. If the implied multiplier is reasonable, then the cross-check confirms the reasonableness of the percentage-based fee; if the implied multiplier is unreasonable, the court should revisit its assumptions.

(*Laffitte, supra,* 1 Cal.5th at p. 496, quoting Walker & Horwich, *The Ethical Imperative of a Lodestar Cross-check: Judicial Misgivings About "Reasonable Percentage" Fees in Common Fund Cases* (2005) 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1453, 1463.) As described by the California Supreme Court, "[i]f the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar crosscheck is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment." (*Laffitte, supra,* 1 Cal.5th at 505.)

Here, the multiplier sought by Class Counsel is below the range California courts typically award, and it is supported by the percentage cross-check and Class Counsel's declarations. Thus, the Court finds Class Counsel's requested fee award is reasonable.

Class Counsel also seeks $11,346.48 in litigation costs, which is below the $25,000 allowed for in the Settlement. The request is supported by Class Counsel's declarations. This amount is reasonable and thus, it is approved.

Plaintiff requests a Class Representative Enhancement payment of $10,000.

> The rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class. An incentive award is appropriate if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit. Criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: 1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; 2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; 3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; 4) the duration of the litigation and; 5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. These "incentive awards" to class representatives must not be disproportionate to the amount of time and energy expended in pursuit of the lawsuit.

(*Cellphone Termination Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394-1395, internal punctuation and citations omitted.) Incentive awards are particularly appropriate where a plaintiff undertakes a significant reputational risk in bringing an action against an employer. (*Covillo v. Specialty's Café* (N.D. Cal. 2014) 2014 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 29837, at *29.)

Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of his request. He states that he has spent 32-40 hours on this action, including meeting and communicating with counsel, providing information, contacting individuals regarding participation in this action, and reviewing documents. (Plaintiff's Declaration ("Decl."), ¶¶ 2-7.) He considered the personal and financial risks of participating in this action. (Plaintiff Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to a service award and the amount requested is reasonable. Thus, Plaintiff's request for a service award is approved.

VI. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:

Plaintiffs' motion for final approval is GRANTED. The following Class is certified for settlement purposes only:

All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California as a non-exempt employee at any time during the period from August 2, 2020, through July 12, 2025.

Judgment will be entered through the filing of this order and judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 668.5.) The members of the Class will take only the relief set forth in the settlement agreement and this order and judgment. Pursuant to Rule 3.769(h) of the California Rules of Court, the Court will retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and the final order and judgment.

The Court sets a compliance hearing for **July 15, 2027 at 2:30 P.M.** in Department 22. At least ten court days before the hearing, class counsel and the settlement administrator shall submit a summary accounting of the net settlement fund identifying distributions made as ordered herein; the number and value of any uncashed checks; amounts remitted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 384, subdivision (b); the status of any unresolved issues; and any other matters appropriate to bring to the Court's attention. Counsel shall also submit an amended judgment as described in Code of Civil Procedure section 384, subdivision (b). Counsel may appear at the compliance hearing remotely.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 10-15-26

BETH MCGOWEN

Judge of the Superior Court