CONTRA COSTA REPUBLICANS

2024 GENERAL ELECTION

ELECTION INTEGRITY REPORT

ELECTION INTEGRITY SUBCOMMITTEE

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INTRODUCTION

California elections have drawn increasing scrutiny due to concerns over the mail-in ballot process and delays in certifying results. To address these issues, the Contra Costa County Republican Central Committee formed an Election Integrity Sub-Committee (EISC) to examine the county's election process during the November 2024 General Election. The goal: to advocate for greater transparency and security.

California's Vote-by-Mail system, which automatically sends ballots to every registered voter, raises legitimate concerns. The process is prone to voter fraud, inefficiencies, and errors. Extracting ballots manually requires extensive labor, signature verification lacks consistency, and some voters inexplicably receive multiple ballots. Equipment security and infrastructure redundancy fall short, casting doubt on claims of "the most secure" elections.

Transparency and fraud prevention measures—promoted through marketing materials and social media crafted by PR firm Brown Miller Communications—don't align with our findings. Funded by grant money, these efforts tout security features that we found lacking. We believe those funds would be better spent on practical upgrades, like installing cameras on drop boxes and livestreaming the elections office, rather than polished PR campaigns.

Centralization further complicates the process. Tabulation, once handled at polling places on Election Day, now occurs solely at the county office. Without local counts or voter ID, eligibility hinges on the VoteCal system. Decentralizing operations could reduce reliance on expensive marketing to prove transparency—and instead, simply show it.

We're Here to Answer Your Questions

Contact or Visit Contra Costa County Elections

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ELECTIONS — MORE SECURE THAN EVER
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

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Click To Visit The County Elections Home Page

This website is paid for by a grant for voter education

Background: https://www.secure-election.org/resources

Foreground: https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Contra-Costa-Launches-Campaign-to-Elevate-Trust-in-Elections.html?soid=1101691846889&aid=2siihSRMLFQ

Links also archived on web.archive.org

METHODOLOGY

The Election Integrity Sub-Committee (EISC), with the help of many citizen volunteers, observed election activities throughout the County. These efforts included poll monitoring, election drop box surveillance, on-site observation of procedures at the County Elections Office, tracking of mail-in ballot data subscriptions, and documenting voter-reported issues for referral. Problems and concerns were recorded in a case log and analyzed using AI to identify trends, potential issues, and opportunities for fraud. These findings are documented herein, with the full Case Log attached in the Appendix. While it is not our responsibility to prove the election system is inaccurate or fraudulent—rather, that burden lies with the Elections Office to demonstrate its security, transparency, and accuracy—we nonetheless felt compelled to highlight inaccuracies and suggest opportunities for improvement.

VOLUNTEER BREAKDOWN BY AREA OF FOCUS

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
KEY FINDINGS

KEY FINDING #1

Weak Election Security Creates Tampering Opportunities

KEY FINDINGS #2

Inconsistent Processes and Training Compromise Integrity

KEY FINDINGS #3

Voter Roll Issues and Fraud Indicators Suggest High Probability of Illegitimate Votes

TOPICS

1. **Election Security** (Cases 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 28)
   - Physical security of equipment (e.g., BMDs, server room) and processes.
   - Use of unnumbered tie wraps, open server rooms, and lack of cameras during extraction.
2. **Process Integrity** (Cases 1, 6, 7, 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37)
   - Procedures for ballot handling, adjudication, certification, and poll worker actions.
   - Lack of standardization (e.g., pairing workers, handling surrendered ballots, counting at polling places).
3. **Voter Roll Management** (Cases 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 32, 38, 41, 45, 76)
   - Cleanup of voter rolls, verification of voter eligibility, and handling of inactive voters.
   - Issues with non-citizen data, duplicate entries, and invalid addresses.
4. **Documentation and Procedures** (Cases 10, 11, 12, 22, 23)
   - Lack of clarity, detail in, or missing procedures for provisional ballots, UOCAVA ballots, and manual tallies.
5. **Voting System Testing** (Case 5)
   - Adequacy of Logic & Accuracy tests for tabulators.
6. **Ballot Handling and Integrity** (Cases 24, 46)
   - Physical ballot issues (e.g., folds causing adjudication) and theft (e.g., Byron Post Office burglary).
7. **Data Collection and Transparency** (Cases 31, 42, 43, 44)
   - Need for detailed tracking of ballots and server logs for accountability.
8. **Training of Poll Workers** (Cases 36, 40, 71, 73, 74)
   - Inconsistent or inadequate training leading to procedural errors.
9. **Curing Process Issues** (Cases 35, 47-49, 51, 54-56, 58, 61-63, 66)
   - Curing list requires conversion from pdf file format for data review
   - Voters not receiving cure letters, hindering ballot correction efforts.
10. **Voter Fraud Concerns** (Cases 39, 50, 52, 53, 57, 59, 60, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 76)
    - Reports of stolen ballots, fraudulent voting, and lack of oversight.
    - Elections Office and DA have obligation to refer and investigate, (respectively) all instances of voter fraud and report back with status and/or resolution.
11. **Infrastructure and Operations** (Cases 14, 28, 74)
    - Power outages and lack of backup systems (e.g., UPS) disrupting processes.
    - Transparency shortfalls: online streaming, dropbox cameras, visitor log visibility, some of signature verification and all of adjudication viewing.

CONCERNS

1. **Security Vulnerabilities**
   - Unnumbered tie wraps (Cases 2, 3) and propped-open server rooms (Case 4) could allow tampering with BMDs or servers.
   - Thumb drives moving between internet-connected devices and Dominion servers (Case 8) pose a cybersecurity risk (e.g., Stuxnet-style attacks).
   - Lack of cameras or oversight during extraction (Case 9) reduces accountability.
2. **Procedural Weaknesses**
   - No requirement for bipartisan adjudication teams (Case 6) risks bias.
   - Single-person certification by the Registrar (Case 7) lacks checks and balances.
   - Inconsistent poll worker training (Cases 36, 40,71, 72, 73) leads to errors like improper ballot handling.
3. **Verification Gaps**
   - Voters cannot verify QR codes on BMD ballots (Case 1), undermining trust in tabulation.
   - Logic & Accuracy tests (Case 5) don't confirm accurate vote counting, only consistency.
   - Eligibility verification for UOCAVA and first-time voters (Cases 16, 17) is unclear or outsourced.
4. **Voter Roll Integrity**
   - Invalid addresses (Case 38), duplicate entries (Case 41), and potential non-citizen voting (Cases 18, 19) suggest outdated or inaccurate rolls.
   - Inactive voters can place votes at polling locations without ID (identity theft).
5. **Ballot Processing Issues**
   - Folds near bubbles triggering adjudication (Case 24) and no checks for duplicate/excess pages (Case 25) could distort results.
   - Stolen ballots (Case 46) and unreceived dropbox ballots (Case 37) indicate chain-of-custody failures.
6. **Transparency and Oversight**
   - Power outages interrupting signature verification monitoring (Case 14) and restricted observer access (Case 68) limit public scrutiny.
   - Lack of detailed data tracking (Case 31) hinders auditing.
7. **Curing Process Failures**
   - Multiple voters not receiving cure letters (Cases 47-49, etc.) prevents correction of valid ballots, potentially disenfranchising voters.
   - File format prevents ease of access to sort data; requires file conversion (Case 35)
8. **Potential Fraud Indicators**
   - Voters reporting they didn't vote yet ballots were submitted (Cases 39, 50, 52, 53, 59, 60) suggest possible impersonation or theft.
   - Deceased voters potentially still on rolls (Cases 64, 65).

FRAUD EXPOSURE

1. **Tampering with Equipment**
   - Unsecured BMDs (Cases 2, 3) could be opened and resealed with identical tie wraps.
   - Thumb drive use (Case 8) opens a vector for malware injection into the Dominion server.

2. **Ballot Manipulation**
   - Lack of duplicate/excess page checks (Case 25) allows insertion of fraudulent ballots.
   - Stolen ballots from dropboxes or post offices (Cases 37, 46) could be filled out and submitted.

3. **Voter Impersonation**
   - Inadequate voter eligibility checks (Cases 22, 36) and stolen ballots from relocated voters (Cases 50, 52, 53, 60) enable fraudulent voting.
   - Invalid or duplicate voter roll entries (Cases 38, 41, 76) could be exploited.

4. **Insider Fraud**
   - Non-random pairing of workers (Case 27) increases the risk of collusion among relatives or friends.
   - Unobserved extraction (Case 9) and lack of counting ballots at polling places (Case 29) provide opportunities for ballot stuffing or removal.
   - Unable to observe processing of provisional ballots.

5. **Post-Election Manipulation**
   - Subjective resolution of 1% Manual Tally discrepancies (Case 23) and recounts matching machine results (Case 26) could mask errors or fraud.
   - Prolonged counting without voter ID (Case 69) allows late fraudulent ballots to be introduced.

6. **Exploitation of Curing Process**
   - Non-delivery of cure letters (Cases 47-49, etc.) could suppress valid votes, while fraudulent ballots from stolen identities (Cases 39, 50, etc.) go unchallenged.

7. **Data Obfuscation**
   - Lack of detailed ballot tracking (Cases 31, 43, 44) and non-sorting curing lists (Case 35) obscure potential discrepancies.

CONCLUSION

The data highlights systemic issues in election security, process standardization, voter roll accuracy, and transparency that collectively erode trust and create vulnerabilities. Concerns center on inadequate safeguards, unclear procedures, and insufficient oversight, while opportunities for fraud range from physical tampering to insider collusion and voter impersonation. Addressing these would require enhanced security measures, standardized training, robust voter roll maintenance, and improved data transparency.

TAKEAWAY #1

Multiple cases (e.g., Cases 2, 3, 4, 8, 9) reveal significant vulnerabilities in physical and cybersecurity measures. Unnumbered tie wraps on BMDs, loose stacks of tie wraps in testing areas, propped-open Dominion server rooms, and thumb drives transferring data between internet-connected devices and election servers indicate a lack of robust safeguards. These gaps could allow unauthorized access or malware introduction (e.g., Stuxnet-style attacks), undermining the integrity of voting equipment and results.

TAKEAWAY #2

Procedural inconsistencies and inadequate poll worker training are recurring issues (e.g., Cases 6, 25, 27, 36, 40, 71, 72). Examples include non-bipartisan adjudication teams, no checks for duplicate ballot pages, non-random worker pairing, and poll workers mishandling ballots (e.g., allowing standard voting despite address mismatches). These lapses risk bias, errors, or intentional manipulation, weakening the reliability of ballot processing and vote counting.

TAKEAWAY #3

The data points to voter roll inaccuracies and potential fraud (e.g., Cases 38, 39, 41, 50, 52, 53, 57, 59, 60, 76). Invalid addresses (e.g., an airplane hangar), duplicate entries from compound surnames, and reports of voters who didn't vote yet had ballots submitted highlight eligibility and impersonation risks. Combined with stolen ballots (e.g., Cases 46, 37) and unaddressed inactive voter ballots (Case 20), this suggests fraudulent votes could be cast and counted undetected.

APPENDIX A : CASE LOG

Case Number	Date Opened	Subject	Description	Category
1	9/19/2024	No way for voter to read QR code on BMD printed ballot	There is no way for a voter to confirm that the bar code printed by the BMD, and used to tabulate the ballot, matches the voter's selections.	Process
2	9/19/2024	BMD sealed using unnumbered red tie wraps	After the BMD machines are tested, they are sealed using red tie wraps that are not numbered. If someone has access to that style of tie wrap, a BMD could be opened and resealed without evidence that it had been accessed.	Election Security
3	9/19/2024	Red tie wraps used to seal BMDs lying loose in BMD test area	The red, unnumbered tie wraps that are used to seal the BMD machines after testing are left in loose stacks in the test area. It appears that anyone in the area could take some for future use.	Election Security
4	10/11/2024	Lack of security at Dominion server room	The door to the Dominion server room is propped open much of the time.	Election Security
5	10/11/2024	Logic & Accuracy test is inadequate	Logic & Accuracy test just reruns batches of ballots to see if the results match on multiple runs. It does not verify that the tabulators are tabulating the selections on the ballot accurately.	Voting System Testing
6	10/11/2024	No requirement for individuals doing adjudication to	There are two individuals paired to do adjudication but there is no	Process

		be from different political parties	requirement for the two to be from different political parties.	
7	10/11/2024	Election is certified by the Registrar of Voters (Individually)	Kristin Connelly stated that she is the one person that certifies the Contra Costa County election, i.e., she determines if all of the documentation from the election is in order and that the election can be certified as being a true and accurate accounting of all the legal votes cast.	Process
8	10/11/2024	Thumb drive used to port intermediate election results to a computer connected to the internet	Thumb drive is used on election night to transfer intermediate election results to the SoS office for distribution to the media. Process needs clarification. If the same thumb drive is taken back to the Dominion server after being connected to the internet it poses a security threat to the Dominion server (see Stuxnet virus).	Election Security
9	10/11/2024	Inadequate security during extraction process at VB court	There is no security other than the election workers themselves and no security cameras. The extraction process is a phase that apparently has a significantly reduced level of security.	Election Security
10	10/20/2024	Receiving ballots from polling places	Is there a procedure describing how the sealed ballot boxes are received from the polling places and how the contents of the incoming ballot boxes are verified (e.g., all required documents properly filled out; number of ballots checked against documented count; number of provisional ballots, etc.)?	Documentation
11	10/20/2024	Procedure for handling	Is there a procedure describing how provisional ballots are handled, how	Documentation

		provisional ballots	the eligibility of the voter is determined, and how discrepancies are adjudicated?	
12	10/20/2024	UOCAVA Ballots - what is the process for receiving and handling UOCAVA ballots	Is there a procedure for receiving and validating Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots?	Documentation
13	10/24/2024	Could we get a list of the voters whose VBM ballots were returned unopened?	Could we get a list of the voters whose VBM ballots were returned unopened?	Voter Roll
14	10/28/2024	Signature verification monitors down due to power outage	On 10/28/24, the Elections Office experienced a power outage that interrupted the display of video from the signature verification process. For at least half a day, the process was not observable by the public.	Operations
15	10/30/2024	Black pens in adjudication area and extraction tables in warehouse.	Multiple black pens were observed in the adjudication area.	Process
16	10/30/2024	UOCAVA Ballots - how is voter eligibility determined	Procedure for verifying eligibility of UOCAVA voters is unknown.	Voter Roll

17	10/30/2024	Verification of eligibility for first-time voters	Eligibility of first-time voters is determined by the SoS office in Sacramento and transmitted to the county via VoteCal. Process is vague and needs clarification.	Voter Roll
18	10/30/2024	Non-citizen driver's licenses issued by DMV	Can Contra Costa Republican Party acquire information from DMV on non-citizens that have received drivers licenses?	Voter Roll
19	10/30/2024	Non-citizen info from Contra Costa jury pool	Can Contra Costa Republican Party acquire information from the Contra Costa Court System on individuals that refused jury service due to being non-citizens?	Voter Roll
20	10/30/2024	Flagging ballots from Inactive voters	If a ballot was cast by a voter that had a status of Inactive, the county does not confirm it is not identity theft.	Process
21	10/30/2024	Backup plan for cell service failure	The poll pads are connected to the internet via a cellular network. If the cellular network goes down on election day, how would the election be conducted?	Process
22	10/30/2024	Remote Accessible VBM Procedure	The procedure states that if the voter has not been issued a VBM ballot, "tell the voter you will mail them a ballot." The procedure does not state anything about determining the individual's identity or eligibility (e.g., citizenship status, resident, felon, etc.). Maybe the determination of eligibility is implied somehow?	Documentation
23	10/30/2024	1% Manual Tally - Procedure needs clarification	In the procedure describing the 1% Manual Tally exercise, it states that discrepancies will be "resolved or explained." How flexible is this standard? It seems very subjective and subject to interpretation. Are	Documentation

			there any circumstances under which the 1% Tally test would fail?	
24	11/1/2024	Ballot folds near selection bubbles should be avoided	Ballot folds near selection bubbles can cause a ballot to go to adjudication because the scanner reads the fold as a "Hesitation Mark."	Ballot
25	11/2/2024	During the extraction process, no check for duplicate pages or excess pages	During the extraction process, the workers are not required to check for duplicate pages or excess pages. Concern is that if a voter had access to extra ballot pages, they could insert illegitimate ballot pages (duplicate pages or excess pages) into the envelope that would then be counted.	Process
26	11/8/2024	1% Manual Tally - Process Issue	For each race manually tabulated, the result from the tabulator is used as the reference and the counters are asked to repeat the count until it matches the machine generated number. Would it be better to have another team count the same race to see whether their count matches the first team's count or the machine's?	Process
27	11/8/2024	Pairing of election workers	How are election workers paired for tasks that require pairs (e.g., extraction, adjudication, duplication)? Should individuals be paired by random draw so that relatives, friends are less likely to be working together?	Process
28	11/8/2024	Election equipment should be on UPS	Equipment used for tabulating, adjudication, signature verification should be on an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) to eliminate disruptions due to power failures.	Infrastructure

29	11/9/2024	Ballots not counted at polling place when closing	When the polling place closes on election day, the ballots are not counted prior to being transported to the Elections Office.	Process
30	11/10/2024	Ineligible voters - voter role changes between VBM list and election day	If a voter is removed from the voter roll between the time the VBM ballots are mailed out and election day, where would that be caught?	Process
31	11/11/2024	Collection of data during ballot processing.	Would be nice to get the following and graph. 1. #Ballots completed for signature picture 2. #Ballots signature verification completed 3. #Ballots extracted 4. #Ballots scanned Data from every process and with dates and times. It would also be nice to add total FTEs and overlay that on the process steps.	Data
32	11/12/2024	Voter roll cleanup as a result of returned, unopened VBM ballots	When unopened VBM ballots are returned to the Elections Office, what is the process for updating the voter roll.	Process

33	11/15/2024	VBM Ballot Reporting	Voters are deleted from the AVMJ010 Vote by mail subscriptions when registration is canceled / transferred to another county (instead of showing the ballot as voided).	Process
34	11/15/2024	Election Results	Election Results PDF presents a total voters cast and total cards counted; if every ballot only has five cards, the total ballots scanned should not be more than five times the voters cast. VBM cards counted = 2,291,816 and should be no more than 2,290,955 and In person cards counted = 304,280 and should be no more than 304,435.	Process
35	11/15/2024	Curing list provided by Elections Office is unusable for managing curing efforts	Curing list (also called "subscription file") provided by Elections Office for ballot curing is provided in PDF format. PDF format is practically unusable for managing curing efforts among a team of people. The list should be provided in Excel format.	Process

36	11/18/2024	Poll worked allowed voter to vote on standard ballot even though they provided a different address compared to the record in the poll pad.	Poll worker allowed voter to vote even though they provided a different address compared to the record in the poll pad. Poll worker should have required the voter to fill out a provisional ballot. Reported by ████████[1] via email to cocorepulicans on 11/13/24.	Training
37	11/18/2024	Ballot dropped in the dropbox never received by Elections Office.	Voter voted early and deposited his VBM ballot in the dropbox in front of Elections Office, but they have no record of it being received. Also reports his in-laws VBM ballots were not received. This was reported from ████████[2] on 11/6/24. via the cocorepublican email address.	Process
38	11/26/2024	Invalid voter address on voter roll	Voter ███████████████ ██████████[3] appears to be an invalid address. Address is an airplane hanger, not an apartment (per ████[4]). Submitted by ██████████[5].	Voter Roll
39	11/26/2024	Possible fraudulent ballot	During the curing process, voter ███████████████████ ███████[6] was contacted to cure his ballot. He says he didn't vote. Submitted by █████████[5].	Possible Voter Fraud
40	11/27/2024	Voter not allowed to use VBM ballot at polling place	Voter wanted to use her VBM ballot at her polling place: DeAnza High School, 5000 Valley View Road, Richmond. Was told by poll worker VBM ballot could not be used. Her ballot was voided, and she was directed to fill out a new ballot. (Issue	Training

			reported in email on 11/22/24 by ██████████ [7] to ██████████ [8])	
41	11/27/2024	Duplicate voter roll entries due to voters with compound surname.	Some voters with compound surname are entered into the voter roll twice. Example: On the curing list, ████████████████ [9] also shows up in another entry as █████ ████████ [10]. (Issue reported by ████████████ [5] in email to ████ ████████ [11] on 11/27/24.	Voter Roll
42	12/10/2024	Review of logs from Dominion server	Could we do a review of the activity log from the Dominion server to ensure no anomalies or suspicious events occurred? This will require an individual with technical expertise. (i.e., ████████ [12]?)	Data
43	12/10/2024	Record the number of VBM ballots mailed out	For the Nov 5,2024, and future elections, find out the number of VBM ballots mailed out. This can then be compared to the number of registered voters at the time. Also compare to the number of completed VBM ballots received, and ballots returned as undeliverable.	Data
44	12/10/2024	Record the number of VBM ballots received	Record the number of VBM ballots received so that it can be compared to the VBM ballots counted	Data
45	12/31/2024	Order Monthly Voter Rolls	████ [11] and ████ [8] have been tracking numeric changes - would be informative to see the data on a regular basis. We're nearly at the point where Judicial Watch sent a letter to CoCo in 2020. We were at 734K then and are now back up to 732K from a low of 706K in November, 2023.	Voter Roll

46	12/31/2024	Byron Post Office Burglary	Byron resident ████████████ [13] told ████████ [8] that the Byron Post Office had been burglarized just as ballots dropped. He and his girlfriend's ballots were missing. He is not sure how many other might be missing. He was interviewed by ██ ████ [14] with KPIX but the story was not reported.	Ballot Theft
47	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ██████████ [15] of Brentwood was contacted by ████ ████████ [16] to cure ballot. Voter told ████ [16] she never received cure letter from county. ████ [16] gave county number to voter.	Cure Issue
48	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ██████████ [17] of Danville was contacted by ██████████ [16] to cure ballot. Voter told ████ [16] she never received cure letter from county. ████ [16] gave county number to voter.	Cure Issue
49	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ████████████ [18] of Brentwood contacted by ████ [16] to cure ballot. Voter told ████ [16] she never received cure letter from county. ████ [16] gave county number to voter.	Cure Issue
50	12/31/2024	Stolen Ballot	████████ [8] contacted Lafayette voter ██████████ [19] to cure ballot. Voter advised that she had moved and had not returned her ballot. ████ ████████ [8] reported fraud to Helen Nolan of Contra Costa Election Office at county.	Voter fraud
51	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ██████████ [20] of Antioch said he never received cure letter.	Cure Issue

52	12/31/2024	Stolen Ballot	Voter ███████████ [21], formerly of Danville, was contacted by ████ ████████ [11] to cure ballot. Voter told ████ [11] he moved away and did not attempt to vote in Contra Costa.	Voter fraud
53	12/31/2024	Stolen Ballot	Voter ██████████████ [22], formerly of Pinole, was contacted by volunteer to cure ballot. Voter said he moved away and did not attempt to vote in Contra Costa.	Voter fraud
54	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ████████ [23] of Moraga never received cure letter from county.	Cure Issue
55	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ████████████ [24] of Pleasant Hill never received cure letter from county.	Cure Issue
56	12/31/2024	Signature Verification Issue	Voter ██████████ [25] of Pleasant Hill said his ballot was rejected so he resubmitted his signature and that attempt was rejected, as well.	Cure Issue
57	12/31/2024	Incorrect Address	Volunteer ██████ [4] said Voter ████ ███████ [3] of ███████████████ ██████ is a locked airplane hangar - not an apartment (Duplicate entry)	Voter fraud
58	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ███████████████ [26] of Hercules never received cure letter from county.	Cure Issue
59	12/31/2024	Stolen Ballot	Voter ████████████ [27] of Concord told volunteer he did not attempt to vote.	Voter fraud
60	12/31/2024	Stolen Ballot	Voter ██████ [28] of Hercules said lives in Fremont and did not vote in Contra Costa.	Voter fraud
61	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ██████████████ [29] of Pleasant Hill said she never received cure letter from county.	Cure Issue

62	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ██████████[30] of Antioch said he never received cure letter from county.	Cure Issue
63	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ████████████[31] of Richmond said she never received cure letter from county.	Cure Issue
64	12/31/2024	Possible deceased voter	Volunteer thinks voter ████████ █[32] of Discovery Bay is deceased.	Voter fraud
65	12/31/2024	Possible deceased voter	Volunteer thinks voter ████████ [33] of Bay Point is deceased.	Voter fraud
66	12/31/2024	No Cure Letter from County	Voter ██████████[34] of Oakley said she never received cure letter from county.	Cure Issue
67	10/23/2024	Lack of Communication with Oversight Team	Volunteer: On one of my 1st days doing signature verification, I was concerned about never communicating with the C.C. voter team on signatures that did not match.	Voter Fraud
68	10/25/2024	No access/move about to other areas on-site	Volunteer: I would have liked to observe on my own with little notice to see exactly what was going on. And we could not observe in the machine/counting room. *[if there were multiple observers that wanted to observe at different locations, there were not enough observer escorts to have observers in different places.]*	Voter fraud
69	11/6/2024	Time to Count Ballots (Observer Concern)	This really was the biggest problem in my eyes after the actual election our entire state counted an additional 5 weeks. How can Florida finish in one day? Prefer voter ID and mail in ballots to the elderly and the disabled/absentee.	Voter fraud

| 70 | 3/1/2025 | Votes Cast Counting | Per Helen Nolan of Contra Costa Election Office in response to a question about the number of cards not balancing to the number of voters (IE: 5 cards per voter max): "We count how many voters have cast ballots by counting the A card. Voters are not required to return the A card, however, and while the Presidential race is clearly the most popular, many times voters do not choose to cast their vote and may return any of the other cards, which do not add +1 to the number of voters. Or, they may only return the A card, which skews the Cards Cast even more. In addition, any voter who uses the Ballot Marking Device to vote then casts one card, not five, just to add to the confusion. In any election with multiple card ballots, it's nearly impossible to match the number of voters to the number of cards cast, and 5 cards per voter gives us an even wider range of discrepancies. We are still reconciling all voting history and working on duplicating ballot cards that were damaged – lots of A cards - so as we tabulate those, the number under Voters Cast will increase. I can also confirm that yes, we trained poll workers to check for no more than 5 ballot cards when a voter wished to vote using the VBM ballot they already had in their possession, and our sincere hope is that the poll workers were also diligent to issue the correct number of ballots to each voter. Our extractors were trained to | Voter Counts |

			set aside any VBM ballots they discovered contained more than the 5 cards (we saw a few where the husband and wife both signed one envelope and returned both ballots inside)."	
71	11/5/2024	Training of poll workers - same day voting using MIB	Poll workers unaware of changes to procedures such as allowing voters to use their mail in ballots without the envelope to vote same day. Observed at Acalanes and OS church	Process
72	11/5/24	Training of poll workers - surrendered ballot	Poll workers all had different ways to take surrendered ballots. Some used sharpie to "x" out bar code. Lack of privacy for those voters who already filled it in.	Process
73	3/1/2024	Training of poll workers - Provisional ballot	At voting sites for primary and election day, county was not called for each provisional ballot	Process
74	11/3/2024	Training of poll workers - time to switch it up	I appreciate the camaraderie I saw among poll workers who have worked together before but it led to a complacency, especially from the supervisors. Suggest switching up the chairs to other sites. Workers going by how things have always been done versus changing as some rules have	Process
75	11/04/24	Polling Place is also hosting a Food Bank pick-up	Poll Observer: The Polling location The Refuge Church, 1187 Meadow Ln, Concord, CA 94520, also hosted a Food Bank from 3:00p to 5:00p. It created confusion and extreme car traffic such that voters reported having to spend 40 to 50 minutes to find parking and walk over to the polling location. The Food Bank recipients were lined up exactly	

| | | | where the beginning line for voters was. The very long Food Bank line went all the way past the front of the church and into the front of the adjacent apartment building. Voters driving by or trying to find parking were left to mistakenly think that the people in the quite long Food Bank line were in line to vote or were dissuaded from voting because the presumed line to vote was too long. We have no way of knowing how many voters turned away deciding not to vote because of this. The poll observer was told that this happens yearly. | |
| 76 | 11/04/24 | The lack of a consistent naming convention causes confusion | Poll observer notice that many of the voters with Hispanic compound names registered using multiple surnames. This led to increased time to check the voters in. The observer suspects that this led to the inordinate number of provisional votes at this precinct because the poll workers had difficulty locating the voter in the registry. Is this a potential area for fraud? | |